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Abstract
By exploiting a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa, we study
previously examined and unexamined firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade. We
document that foreign affiliates engaging in intra-firm trade are relatively few and that
the majority of these also engage in trade at arm’s length, which accounts for an important
fraction of their total trade. The identified firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade are
consistent with property rights and intangible assets theories of the multinational firm,
with international production hierarchies theories, as well as with theories of different FDI
types and of multinational activity under credit constraints.
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1 Introduction
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) constitute the main locomotive in the current process
of global fragmentation of production. The ensuing creation of trade within multinational
firm boundaries (henceforth, intra-firm trade) has received particular attention recently and
is by now well documented in the international trade literature.1 The latter observation has
motivated research on the determinants of intra-firm trade, resulting in several key theoretical
predictions and empirical evidence.2 In this paper, we improve our understanding of the firm-
level determinants of intra-firm trade by making three novel contributions to the literature.
First, in addition to previously examined firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade such
as employment (Ramondo et al., 2016), productivity and skill intensity (Corcos et al., 2013),
the richness of our dataset allows us to look into the potential role of many other charac-
teristics of foreign affiliates in intra-firm trade. In particular, we consider their intangible to
tangible capital ratio, their status as majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs), their age,
their creation as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), their principal business scope (e.g. market
or input access), their shares of finance of working capital from various sources including the
parent company, and their tax to sales ratio. In doing so, this paper is the first to identify
firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade which pertain not only to property rights theories
but rather, to a wider array of theories of the MNC. Second, we advance the existing litera-
ture which focuses only on the existence (extensive margin) and share (intensive margin) of
intra-firm imports by considering throughout the empirical analysis the two margins of both
intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports.
Third, the stylised facts on the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm and arm’s
length trade and the firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade that we uncover are based
on a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa. Focusing on MNCs in this
region is particularly important for two main reasons. The first reason is that part of our
findings have been documented only with the use of data on developed countries, namely
the US (Antra`s, 2003; Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ramondo et al., 2016) and France (Corcos
et al., 2013). The second reason is that the African continent, despite lagging behind other
developing regions such as South-East Asia and Latin America in terms of FDI inflows, has
1Among others, see Hanson et al. (2001), OECD (2002), Borga and Zeile (2004), Hanson et al. (2005), and
Bernard et al. (2010).
2For surveys of this literature, see Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) and Antra`s and Yeaple (2013).
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experienced a remarkable increase in this regard in recent decades. Specifically, between 1990
and 2015 Africa’s FDI inflows rose from US$2.8 billion to US$54.1 billion and its FDI stock
from 13.6% of GDP to 32.1% (UNCTAD and UNIDO, 2011; UNCTAD, 2016).
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we draw firm-level data from the UNIDO Africa
Investor Survey 2010. The dataset comprises 1466 foreign affiliates that engage in international
trade and covers all economic sectors and 19 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009. Foreign
affiliates are formally registered businesses whose parent companies are located in countries
of various income and development levels inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
In order to empirically identify the firm-level determinants of the extensive and intensive
margins of intra-firm trade, we estimate probit and OLS models, respectively. In the first case,
the dependent variable is a dummy indicating the foreign affiliate’s engagement in intra-firm
imports or intra-firm exports. In the second case, the dependent variable is the share of intra-
firm imports or exports. In all regressions, we control for unobserved heterogeneity across
affiliate countries, affiliate industries and parent countries by incorporating the respective
fixed effects.
Starting with the findings of the descriptive statistics analysis, we report three main
stylised facts. First, foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade are relatively few as they account
for only 36% of the whole sample of trading firms. This is consistent with recent evidence
on the relatively low shares of affiliated parties which trade with each other across borders
(Corcos et al., 2013; Ramondo et al., 2016) and within borders (Atalay et al., 2014). Second,
the vast majority of foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade engage in arm’s length trade as
well. Similarly, data on French firms reveal that intra-firm and arm’s length trade are jointly
observed in almost all industries and combinations of firms, products and destination countries
(Corcos et al., 2013). Third, arm’s length trade in foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade
accounts on average for an important share of their total trade.
As key findings of the econometric analysis, we document that foreign affiliates of larger
size, higher productivity and higher skill intensity are more likely to engage in intra-firm
trade and have a higher share of this type of trade. The two margins of intra-firm trade are
also higher in foreign affiliates with greater intangible relative to tangible capital and with a
higher share of finance of working capital through the parent company, as well as in foreign
affiliates whose principal business scope is to access new markets, to lower production costs, to
access inputs and resources, to export back to the home country, and to benefit from a trade
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agreement. These findings are consistent with property rights and intangible assets theories
of the MNC, with international production hierarchies theories, as well as with theories of
different FDI types and of multinational activity under credit constraints.
Regarding other firm characteristics, we find no statistically significant associations of the
extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports with MOFAs,
M&As, the age of foreign affiliates, their tax to sales ratio, and their shares of finance of
working capital with credit from affiliate-country banks, non-affiliate-country banks and family
members.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data,
the construction of variables and descriptive statistics which allow us to uncover stylised facts
on the extensive and intensive margins of foreign affiliates’ intra-firm and arm’s length trade.
In Section 3, we describe the econometric model. In Section 4, we discuss the main empirical
results, while in Section 5, we perform a battery of robustness checks. In Section 6, we
conclude and provide some suggestions for further research.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
We draw all firm-level data from the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010. The survey aimed
at collecting information about “for-profit” public and private businesses and their assessment
of the current business environment in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries.3 Implementation
of stratified sampling by the economic sub-sector, number of employees and ownership of
each firm led to the creation of a representative sample of registered domestic and foreign-
owned firms in all economic sectors in 2009. The quality of data collection was ensured by
the conduct of face-to-face interviews, primarily with the most senior decision maker within
the firm.4 Given that all monetary variables are in national currencies, we express these
in US dollars (US$) by using currency exchange rate data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Intra-firm and arm’s length trade
In total, the dataset comprises 6497 firms, of which 2403 are foreign-owned. Intra-firm
3These are: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
4UNIDO (2011) provides a detailed description of the design and implementation of the survey.
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imports and exports of foreign-owned firms are directly observed in the dataset. This allows
for the identification of the vertical relationship between the foreign affiliate and its parent
company without the need to rely on Input-Output (I–O) tables or disaggregated classifica-
tions of products produced by the two entities (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). In particular,
each foreign affiliate is asked to declare the share of production inputs, by value, imported
from the parent company in total production inputs and the share of direct exports, by value,
to the parent and/or a sister affiliate in total direct exports. As there are 728 foreign affiliates
which have not declared values for both intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports, we drop
these from the sample. Based on this information, we compute the share of arm’s length
exports as the remaining share of exports that is not intra-firm. Regarding the arm’s length
import share, we compute it as the share of production inputs, by value, imported directly and
indirectly from the foreign affiliate in its total production inputs. Alternatively, we compute
it by excluding indirect imports.5
Table 1 reveals that 87.5% of the remaining 1675 foreign affiliates engage in international
trade. That is, the vast majority of foreign affiliates trade either intra-firm or at arm’s length or
both. Among those which trade, 90.2% are importers, 51% are exporters, 41.2% are importers-
exporters, 49% are only importers, and 9.8% are only exporters. Importantly though, foreign
affiliates with intra-firm trade are relatively few, as they account for only 35.9% of the sample
of trading firms. The remaining 64.1% of trading firms trade only at arm’s length. Similarly,
foreign affiliates with intra-firm flows constitute the minority among importing, exporting,
importing-exporting, importing-only, and exporting-only firms (31%, 33.3%, 18.3%, 29%, and
29.4%, respectively).6 Arm’s length trade is a popular activity among foreign affiliates with
intra-firm trade as 96.8% of these engage in this type of trade as well.
<< Table 1 about here >>
A similar analysis across economic sectors, shown in Table 2, produces the same stylised
facts. Using the ISIC Rev. 1.1, we split the whole economy into five sectors: agriculture, min-
5In addition to the share of production inputs, by value, that is imported from the parent company, each
firm is asked to declare the share of production inputs, by value, that it imports directly, as well as the
shares of production inputs, by value, that it sources from local importers (i.e., indirect imports), from local
manufacturers, or from any other source to be specified by the firm. For this reason, the sum of intra-firm and
arm’s length import shares may not necessarily add up to 1, its maximum value.
6As we control for the response rate for intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports, the total numbers of
importing, exporting, importing-exporting, and exporting-only foreign affiliates in rows 7, 9, 11, and 15 of
Table 1 happen to differ from the corresponding ones in rows 6, 8, 10, and 14.
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ing, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water (EGW) supply and construction, and services.7
Based on Hatzichronoglou (1997) and UNCTAD and UNIDO (2011), we further decompose
the manufacturing sector into resource-based, low-tech, and high- and medium-tech manu-
facturing industries. Similarly, based on Eurostat (2011), we further decompose the services
sector into knowledge-intensive and less knowledge-intensive services industries.8
According to Panel A, the vast majority of foreign affiliates in each sector engage in
international trade. The share of these firms ranges between 73.3% in knowledge-intensive
services and 93.1% in high- and medium-tech manufacturing. According to Panels B and
C, foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade are relatively few in all sectors examined, while
those which trade only at arm’s length constitute the majority. The share of foreign affiliates
with intra-firm trade ranges between 31.8% in knowledge-intensive services and 48.5% in
agriculture.9 Finally, according to Panels D and E, the vast majority of foreign affiliates with
intra-firm trade in manufacturing also engage in arm’s length trade, while this is true for all
foreign affiliates in the rest of the sectors.
<< Table 2 about here >>
In Table 3, we focus on foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade in order to shed light on their
import and export shares accounted for by intra-firm and arm’s length transactions. In the
whole economy, the average shares of intra-firm imports and exports of these firms are 65.3%
and 51.7%, respectively, while their average arm’s length import and export shares are 23.5%
and 48.3%. These statistics indicate that arm’s length trade of the average firm, especially its
exports, account for significant shares in their total trade. Producing the same statistics by
sector reveals a very similar pattern. The average share of intra-firm imports ranges between
48.2% in agriculture and 73% in less knowledge-intensive services and is greater than the
7Agriculture: 1–5; Mining: 10–14; Manufacturing: 15–39; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply and Construc-
tion: 40 and 45; Services: 50–99.
8Resource-based manufacturing: 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27; Low-tech manufacturing: 17, 18, 19, 22, 28,
36; High- and medium-tech manufacturing: 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38; Knowledge-intensive services:
61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85, 92; Less knowledge-intensive services: 50, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63,
75, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99.
9The scarcity of foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade is also observed in most of the individual ISIC Rev.
1.1 industries (Table A1), in all 19 Sub-Saharan African countries (Table A2), and in almost all combinations
of parent country types and sectors (Table A3). In the latter case, we consider three types of parent countries:
high-income countries, low/middle-income countries outside Sub-Saharan-Africa, and Sub-Saharan African
countries. The first group comprises parent countries which are classified as high-income by the World Bank’s
Historical Country Classification for the year 2010. Based on the same classification, the second group comprises
parent countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa which are classified as upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income
or low-income.
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average share of arm’s length imports in all sectors examined. The average share of arm’s
length imports ranges between 18.7% in low-tech manufacturing and 37.9% in knowledge-
intensive services. In addition, as the average share of intra-firm exports ranges between
18.5% in EGW supply and construction and 71.8% in agriculture, the highest and lowest
average shares of arm’s length exports, respectively, are observed in these two sectors. Arm’s
length exports account, on average, for the majority of total exports in all sectors except for
agriculture and low-tech manufacturing.10
<< Table 3 about here >>
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics document three main stylised facts. First, among
foreign affiliates which engage in international trade, the majority of these trade exclusively at
arm’s length and only a relatively small fraction, roughly one third of these, trades intra-firm.
Ramondo et al. (2016) and Marin et al. (2013)11 also report that only roughly one third of
foreign affiliates in their samples engage in intra-firm trade. The first study employs the BEA
data on almost the whole population of foreign affiliates of US MNCs, while the second study
employs data on foreign affiliates in Eastern Europe whose parents are based in Austria and
Germany. Similarly, Corcos et al. (2013), with the use of data on French firms, find that only
8.49% of firm-product-destination country triples correspond to intra-firm imports, but they
account for roughly 40% of total imports’ value. Also, using data on affiliated establishments
within the US, Atalay et al. (2014) report that those which trade with each other are relatively
few.
Second, among foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade, the vast majority of these engage in
arm’s length trade as well. This is in line with Corcos et al. (2013) who report that intra-firm
and arm’s length trade coexist in almost all industries and combinations of firms, products and
destination countries. Third, an important share of their total trade, by value, is accounted
for by arm’s length trade.
The scarcity of foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade is an essential stylised fact because it
poses the critical question as to why multinational firm boundaries exist, if not for the transfer
of physical goods. Hence, this evidence seems to favour the view that these boundaries are
crucially determined by the transfer of intangibles (Arrow, 1969; Teece, 1977; Atalay et al.,
10We obtain very similar statistics when we exclude indirect exports from the calculation of the share of
arm’s length exports (Table A4).
11This study, however, investigates a different topic from ours.
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2014). The other two stylised facts suggest that the “make-or-buy” decision is likely to be
made for each stage of the production process. Therefore, possible explanations for these
stylised facts can be the level of upstreamness of each production stage in the value chain
and its degree of good and input complexity. Antra`s and Chor (2013) study how the position
of each production stage in the value chain can impact the internalisation choice of the firm.
In their property rights model of organisational decisions, they use a production function
with a continuum of sequential stages. Based on the effects of effort choices of upstream-
stage suppliers on effort levels at downstream stages of production, they show that upstream
stages are outsourced and downstream stages are internalised when stage inputs are sequential
complements. Instead, when stage inputs are sequential substitutes, upstream stages are
internalised while downstream stages are outsourced. Their predictions are supported by
industry-level data (Antra`s and Chor, 2013), as well as by firm-level data (Alfaro et al.,
2016).
As documented by Corcos et al. (2013), production of complex inputs is more likely to take
place within firm boundaries. Carluccio and Fally (2012) also stress this factor by combining
it with the level of financial development in the supplier’s country. Specifically, they find that
complex goods and inputs are more likely to be imported intra-firm from countries with low
financial development. This result is underpinned by a property rights model in which they
show that the financial constraints faced by suppliers deter firms from transferring ownership
rights to them. The risk level of dissipation of intangible assets used for the production of
complex inputs can also impact the internalisation choice of the firm. The intuition is that
since complex inputs entail the development and use of critical intangible assets such as R&D
and marketing, firms can protect these assets more effectively through internalisation (Corcos
et al., 2013). This explanation is pertinent to the transaction costs approach to the firm,
rather than the property rights approach.
Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade
Additional information of this dataset on characteristics and activities of foreign affiliates
allows us to create variables that capture potential firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade.
As measures of foreign affiliates’ size and productivity, we use the total number of permanent
full-time employees and the ratio of total sales to the total number of permanent full-time
employees, respectively. Using information on the number of permanent full-time managerial,
technical and supervisory workers, we compute skill intensity as the share of these workers in
7
total permanent full-time employment. As a measure of intangible to tangible capital, we use
the ratio of expenditures on training and advertising to the total value of fixed assets. We
also proxy for transfer pricing within MNCs with the ratio of taxes paid by foreign affiliates
to their total sales. Firm age is the number of years since the creation of the foreign affiliate.
There is salient heterogeneity across foreign affiliates in all these dimensions, as indicated by
the summary statistics for the corresponding variables in Table 4.
<< Table 4 about here >>
Based on information on the shares of finance of working capital from various sources, we
capture the channels through which foreign affiliates have access to finance and subsequently,
the channels through which they overcome credit constraints that they possibly face. Foreign
affiliates finance their working capital through internal funds and earnings, credit from banks
in the affiliate country, credit from banks outside the affiliate country, credit from family,
friends or individual lenders, credit from non-bank financial institutions (e.g. equity funds),
purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers, issuance of new equity
shares or new debt (including commercial paper and debentures), through funds from the
parent company, and from any other source to be specified by the firm. According to Table 4,
internal funds and earnings, credit from banks in the affiliate country, purchases on credit from
suppliers and advances from customers, as well as funds from the parent company account on
average for the highest shares of finance of foreign affiliates’ working capital.
Using information on the foreign ownership share, we identify majority-owned foreign
affiliates (MOFAs). MOFAs are defined as firms which are owned by at least 50% by a foreign
investor. In addition, we distinguish between foreign affiliates created through greenfield
FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by using information on five modes of foreign
investment. Greenfield FDI is captured by the creation of a new operation as a wholly-owned
enterprise and the creation of a new operation as a joint venture. M&As are captured by
the purchase of pre-existing assets from local private owners, the purchase of pre-existing
assets from foreign private owners, and the purchase of pre-existing state-owned assets. We
also distinguish across principal business scopes of foreign affiliates or equivalently, across
different types of FDI and combinations of these, as captured by different principal motives for
foreign investment. In particular, access to new markets proxies for horizontal12 and export-
12The MNC serves the foreign market through a foreign affiliate rather than through exports. In doing so,
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platform FDI,13 lower production costs, access to natural resources and inputs, collaboration
with a specific partner in the host country, and exporting back to the home country proxy
for vertical FDI,14 while benefits from a trade agreement potentially proxy for vertical and
export-platform FDI. Any other principal motive for foreign investment is specified by the
firm itself. As shown in Table 5, only a small fraction of foreign affiliates is accounted for by
M&As, while most of these are majority-owned and their principal business scope is to access
new markets.
<< Table 5 about here >>
3 Econometric model
We study the firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade of foreign affiliate z in country c and
industry j, whose parent company is located in country p, by estimating the following model:
Xzcjp =α+ β ∗ Fzcjp + βc ∗Dc + βj ∗Dj + βp ∗Dp + zcjp (1)
We use probit estimations when the dependent variable, Xzcjp, is the dummy for intra-firm
imports or intra-firm exports, capturing the extensive margin of intra-firm trade. Instead, we
estimate the model by OLS when the dependent variable is the share of intra-firm imports
or intra-firm exports, capturing the intensive margin of intra-firm trade. Import and export
regressions are estimated on samples comprising importing and exporting foreign affiliates,
respectively. Unobserved heterogeneity across affiliate countries, affiliate industries and par-
ent countries is accounted for by the respective sets of dummies, Dc, Dp, and Dj . As matrix
F comprises firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade, the marginal effects and coefficient
estimates included in vector β demonstrate whether and how firm characteristics are asso-
the production process of the parent company is replicated into the foreign affiliate. Among others, see Caves
(1982), Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Helpman et al. (2004), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen
and Venables (2000), and Ramondo et al. (2013).
13An affiliate located in a foreign country is used as a platform for serving other markets nearby via exports
(Ekholm et al., 2007; Badinger and Egger, 2010). Ekholm et al. (2007) consider also the special case in which
an affiliate of export-platform type exports back to its parent in order to serve the home market and thus,
engages in intra-firm trade.
14The MNC takes advantage of international factor differentials by transferring part of its production process
to countries where factor prices are lower (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Yeaple, 2003b; Yeaple,
2008).
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ciated with the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm trade. In benchmark probit
estimations, the marginal effect of each covariate is produced across all values of the rest
of the covariates. The selection of the possible firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade
allows us to study several theories and concepts of the MNC. In particular, these covariates
can potentially capture property rights, intangible assets and resource-based theories of the
MNC, international production hierarchies theories, theories of different FDI types, of transfer
pricing and of multinational activity under credit constraints, as well as the strength of ties
between foreign affiliates and their parents.
Recent theoretical frameworks predicated upon the property rights approach to the firm
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) predict that larger, more productive and
skill intensive firms are more likely to engage in intra-firm trade (Antra`s, 2003; Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004; Antra`s and Helpman, 2008). These theoretical predictions are empirically
validated by Antra`s (2003), Corcos et al. (2013) and Nunn and Trefler (2013). Hanson et al.
(2001) are the first to associate the transfer of intermediate inputs from the parent to the
foreign affiliate with the latter entity’s size. Similarly, Ramondo et al. (2016) find that the
main determinant of a foreign affiliate’s intra-firm trade is its size. Grossman et al. (2006)
emphasise the economies of scale in production generated by the concentration of intra-firm
trade in a small number of relatively large affiliated parties, while Helpman et al. (2004) report
productivity premia of MNCs over non-MNC exporters. For this purpose, the first three
covariates of our model are the log of the total number of permanent full-time employees as a
measure of firm size, the log of the ratio of total sales to total permanent full-time employment
as a measure of firm productivity, and the share of permanent full-time managerial workers
in the total number of permanent full-time workers as a measure of the firm’s skill intensity.
Including skill intensity in the model is also motivated by international production hierarchies
theories. Specifically, MNCs save on communication and monitoring costs because managers
in foreign affiliates supervise production workers in these entities who would otherwise be
supervised by managers in the parent company (Antra`s et al., 2008).
Also, according to property rights theories, intra-firm trade is deemed as an effective way
for the parent company to have residual rights of control over relationship-specific assets
(Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009; Antra`s and Yeaple, 2013). As a result, majority owner-
ship of the foreign affiliate may be of utmost importance for the foreign investor. Majority
ownership also implies greater involvement of the parent in the affiliate’s decision-making
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process and greater control over the use of its financial resources (Manova et al., 2015). For
this reason, we include in the model a dummy variable indicating whether a foreign affiliate
is majority-owned or not. What is more, foreign affiliates may start to develop or expand a
network of suppliers and buyers in the host country and overseas which may substitute partly
or fully for intra-firm trade in the course of time. We capture the development of such a
network by including in the model the age of the foreign affiliate, that is, the years since its
establishment.
Ethier (1986) and Ethier and Markusen (1996), among other studies, stress the close ties
between MNCs and knowledge-based capital. We test for intangible asset theories of the MNC
by incorporating in the model the intangible to tangible capital ratio, calculated as the sum
of expenditures on training and advertising divided by the total value of fixed assets.
We also test for the resource-based view of the MNC, according to which there is an
interplay between a firm’s complementary capabilities (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Antra`s and
Yeaple, 2013). Due to the fact that some capabilities such as marketing, distribution and
country-specific institutional competency are likely to be imperfectly mobile, cross-border
M&As allow the acquiring firm to complement its own capabilities with the capabilities of a
local firm. If such complementarity exists, then M&As may determine intra-firm trade. In
addition, the creation of synergies after cross-border M&As may be mutually beneficial for
the acquiring and acquired firms if the latter are capital constrained because they operate in
financially vulnerable sectors (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009; Poncet et al., 2010; Manova and
Yu, 2012; Manova et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2016). For all these reasons, we incorporate in
the model a dummy indicating whether the foreign affiliate was created through M&As. This
dummy can also be considered as an important control variable of the model. The intuition
is that property rights theories of the MNC predict that larger and more productive firms
are more likely to engage in intra-firm trade, while, based on the “cherry-picking” argument,
foreign investors may choose to take over larger and more productive firms in the host country
through M&As (Javorcik, 2004).
In principle, foreign affiliates of horizontal type are unlikely to engage in intra-firm trade,
while those of vertical type, by definition, do. “Export-platform” foreign affiliates also engage
in intra-firm trade in case their exports are directed to affiliated parties overseas. However,
recent empirical evidence for complex FDI and complex integration strategies of MNCs sug-
gests that this sort of classification of foreign affiliates is unlikely to be accurate (UNCTAD,
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1998; Hanson et al., 2001; Yeaple, 2003a; Helpman, 2006). Motivated by this evidence, we
incorporate in the model a set of dummy variables indicating the principal motive for foreign
investment (e.g. new market access) and subsequently, the principal business scope of the
foreign affiliate and the type of FDI. Since these dummies are mutually exclusive, we choose
the dummy indicating any other principal motive for foreign investment to be specified by the
firm as the reference variable. Therefore, their marginal effects and coefficient estimates are
interpreted with respect to this variable.
In addition, transfer pricing is a common practice among MNCs as it allows them to evade
taxation by transferring tangibles and intangibles to their foreign affiliates.15 Had intra-firm
trade been driven solely by transfer pricing, then one would expect to observe remarkable
differences in taxes paid by foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm trade. We test for
this by including in the model the ratio of taxes paid by the foreign affiliate to its total sales.
Motivated by the literature on multinational activity and credit constraints (Antra`s et al.,
2009; Manova et al., 2015) and the vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to financial crises
mostly through the disruption of trade finance channels (Berman and Martin, 2012), we also
include in the model the shares of finance of working capital from various sources, among
which are internal funds and earnings of the foreign affiliate, credit from banks in the affiliate
country or overseas, credit form non-bank financial institutions, as well as funds from the
parent company.
4 Empirical results
We display the estimation results of the benchmark model in Table 6. The firm-level deter-
minants of the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports are studied in the first
two columns, while the firm-level determinants of the two margins of intra-firm exports are
studied in the last two columns. The principal theory or concept of the MNC captured by each
potential firm-level determinant is also shown in the table. The dependent variable in column
1 is the dummy for intra-firm imports. The positive and statistically significant marginal
effects of employment, productivity and skill intensity suggest that larger, more productive
and more skill intensive foreign affiliates are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports. In
addition, the positive and significant marginal effect of the intangible to tangible capital ratio
15Among others, see Desai et al. (2006), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Bauer and Langenmayr (2013),
Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013), and Davies et al. (2017).
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suggests that foreign affiliates with greater intangible relative to tangible capital are more
likely to engage in intra-firm imports. The probability of engagement in intra-firm imports
is also higher in foreign affiliates whose principal business scope is to access new markets,
to access inputs and resources, to lower production costs, to join a specific partner in the
host country, as well as to benefit from a trade agreement. Also, foreign affiliates with higher
shares of finance of working capital through internal funds and earnings, credit from non-bank
financial institutions, purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers, as well
as through the parent company, are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports.
<< Table 6 about here >>
In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of intra-firm imports. Larger, more
productive and more skill intensive foreign affiliates have a higher share of intra-firm imports.
Foreign affiliates whose principal business scope is to access new markets, to access inputs and
resources, to lower production costs, and to benefit from a trade agreement have a higher share
of intra-firm imports as well. The share of intra-firm imports is also higher in foreign affiliates
with higher shares of finance of working capital through issuance of new equity shares or debt
and through the parent company. The dependent variable in column 3 is the dummy for
intra-firm exports. According to this column, larger and more productive foreign affiliates,
as well as those with higher intangible to tangible capital ratio are more likely to engage
in intra-firm exports. The probability of engagement in intra-firm exports is also higher in
foreign affiliates whose principal business scope is to export back to the home country and
in those with a higher share of finance of working capital through the parent company. By
contrast, foreign affiliates whose principal business scope is to join a specific partner in the
host country and those with a lower share of finance of working capital through credit from
non-bank financial institutions are less likely to engage in intra-firm exports.
In column 4, the dependent variable is the share of intra-firm exports. Larger foreign
affiliates and those with a higher intangible to tangible capital ratio have a higher share of
intra-firm exports. The share of intra-firm exports is also higher in foreign affiliates with a
higher share of finance of working capital through the parent company. By contrast, it is
lower in foreign affiliates with a higher share of finance of working capital through credit from
non-bank financial institutions. In all four columns, we do not find statistically significant
associations of the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports
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with M&As, majority-owned foreign affiliates, the age of foreign affiliates, their tax to sales
ratio, and their shares of finance of working capital through credit from affiliate-country banks,
non-affiliate-country banks, family, and from any other source specified by the firm itself.16
Overall, the results in the four columns suggest that foreign affiliates of larger size, higher
productivity and higher skill intensity are more likely to engage in intra-firm trade and have a
higher share of this type of trade. The probability of engagement in intra-firm trade and the
share of intra-firm trade are also higher in foreign affiliates with greater intangible relative
to tangible capital and with higher share of finance of working capital through the parent
company, as well as in foreign affiliates whose principal business scope is to access new markets,
to lower production costs, to access inputs and resources, to export back to the home country,
and to benefit from a trade agreement.
Discussion
The identification of employment, productivity and skill intensity as determinants of intra-
firm trade is consistent with the main predictions of recent theoretical frameworks of the MNC
predicated upon the property rights approach to the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart
and Moore, 1990). According to this approach, a firm can be held up by a non-integrated
supplier after production takes place due to contract incompleteness. Property rights, implied
by the internalisation of production, act as residual rights of control over productive assets
which mitigate the hold-up problem. Based on this concept, Antra`s (2003) builds a partial
equilibrium model which predicts that skill intensive firms are more likely to engage in intra-
firm trade. Also, Antra`s and Helpman (2004) consider firm heterogeneity a` la Melitz (2003)
in order to study different sourcing modes of the firm. They show that the biggest and most
productive firms opt for FDI, that is, for integration of foreign entities. Instead, smaller and
less productive firms opt for foreign outsourcing, that is, for collaboration with unaffiliated
parties overseas. Their prediction is driven by the plausible assumption that the affiliate set-up
cost associated with FDI is greater than the independent supplier search cost associated with
foreign outsourcing. Along with our study, the predictions of the two models are empirically
16We ensure that the fewer observations in benchmark regressions than those in the importing and exporting
firms samples do not result in sample selection which in turn might bias the main results in three ways
(Tables B1 to B6). First, we estimate the benchmark regressions with each type of firm-level determinants
individually. Second, we add sequentially to the model firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade pertaining
to specific theories of the MNC. Third, we estimate the benchmark regressions after dropping the tax to sales
ratio since, according to Table 4, this variable has the highest number of missing observations among all main
covariates. We also ensure that the results of probit estimations do not change quantitatively and qualitatively
when the marginal effect of each covariate is calculated for all other covariates held at their means (Table B7).
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validated with data on the US (Antra`s, 2003; Nunn and Trefler, 2013) and France (Corcos
et al., 2013).
Other relevant empirical evidence is provided by Hanson et al. (2001) and Ramondo et al.
(2016) who employ the US BEA data. The first paper studies the flows of intermediate goods
from the parent to the foreign affiliate by using a measure of affiliate size, while the second
paper finds that the main determinant of a foreign affiliate’s intra-firm trade is its size. The
findings on intra-firm trade and firm size can be also rationalized by the theoretical framework
of Grossman et al. (2006) which studies optimal integration strategies of heterogeneous firms.
According to this framework, concentration of intra-firm trade in a small number of relatively
large affiliated parties allows the MNC to take advantage of economies of scale in production.
Another relevant theoretical framework is that of Helpman et al. (2004) which introduces
firm heterogeneity in a multi-country and multi-sector model where firms face the proximity-
concentration trade-off while servicing foreign markets. The main prediction of this framework
is that the biggest and most productive firms engage in (horizontal) FDI, while smaller and less
productive firms engage in exports. Similar to Antra`s and Helpman (2004), this prediction is
driven by the plausible assumption that the affiliate set-up cost associated with FDI is greater
than the cost of forming a distribution and servicing network associated with exporting. The
same paper validates this prediction with US data by reporting productivity premia of MNCs
over non-MNC exporters.
In addition to property rights theories, our findings on intra-firm trade and skill intensity
may also be explained by international production hierarchies theories. By perceiving the
MNC as an international production team with a knowledge-based hierarchy (Garicano, 2000),
Antra`s et al. (2008) show that the role of managers in foreign affiliates is pivotal as they are
in charge of supervising local production workers. In their absence, this role would have been
undertaken by managers in the parent company which would have increased considerably
communication and monitoring costs.
Our evidence on the intangible to tangible capital ratio being a determinant of intra-firm
trade is rationalised by intangible assets theories. Ethier (1986) incorporates FDI into a gen-
eral equilibrium model of international trade where the internalisation choice is endogenous.
He argues that the main issue for the good understanding of FDI within the trade theory
context is internalisation and that this is mostly driven by the exchange of critical knowledge
between agents. The strong link between MNCs and knowledge-based capital is by now a well-
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documented stylised fact (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; Caves, 1982; Markusen, 1984; Teece,
1986). Exploiting this link, Ethier and Markusen (1996) argue that if a firm’s ownership
advantage is strongly connected to its knowledge-based capital, then its effective protection
will favour the service of a foreign market through a foreign affiliate than through exports or
licencing. Hence, the need for protection of a firm’s knowledge-based capital impacts its mode
of servicing foreign markets. In addition, Mansfield (1995), using survey data, shows that the
perception of intellectual property protection in developing countries impacts the decision of
MNCs to establish affiliates and undertake joint ventures in these countries, as well as the
extent of knowledge transfer to their foreign operations.
Our findings on intra-firm trade and the foreign affiliates’ principal business scope sup-
port the notions of vertical and export-platform FDI (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Ekholm
et al., 2007) and especially, the notions of complex FDI and complex integration strategies
(UNCTAD, 1998; Yeaple, 2003a; Helpman, 2006) which point to different combinations of
FDI. UNCTAD (1998) is the first study to report empirical evidence on such combinations.
Feinberg and Keane (2001) examine affiliates of US MNCs in Canada and find that only 12%
of these are of purely horizontal type and only 19% of purely vertical type. The rest of these
represent complex FDI. In their analysis of operations of US MNCs and their foreign affiliates,
Hanson et al. (2001) conclude that the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI fails
to capture the strategies implemented by MNCs. In addition, Grossman et al. (2006) argue
that in a more realistic theoretical framework with multiple countries and multiple production
stages, the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI becomes less clear.
Finally, our findings on intra-firm trade and the shares of finance of working capital through
the parent and other sources are consistent with empirical evidence of Desai et al. (2004) and
Feinberg and Phillips (2004) who document that foreign affiliates of MNCs in financially
under-developed countries overcome frictions in external capital markets by borrowing from
the parent company. It is also consistent with the theoretical framework of Antra`s et al. (2009)
where MNCs arise endogenously, through the integration of input suppliers who are financially
constrained due to capital market frictions. After integration, input suppliers are directly
funded by the parent company or can borrow more easily from banks in the host country. The
latter, however, is not supported by our results. In addition, this group of findings is pertinent
to empirical evidence on the impact of credit constraints on the choice between (horizontal)
FDI and exporting (Buch et al., 2009) and on the choice among horizontal, vertical and
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export-platform FDI (Bilir et al., 2014). Consistent with FDI substituting for capital market
frictions, Manova et al. (2015) find that foreign affiliates and joint ventures in China have
better export performance than private domestic firms in sectors which are financially more
vulnerable. Also, Desai et al. (2008) find that foreign affiliates of US MNCs expand their
sales and investment by more than domestic companies when facing large real exchange rate
devaluations. Finally, Alfaro and Chen (2012) find that foreign affiliates worldwide performed
better than domestic firms with similar characteristics in the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2007–2008.
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform numerous checks to verify the robustness of the main results. To
save on space, we present only a selection of the relevant tables and relegate all the rest to
the Online Appendix. In order to account for any characteristics of affiliate-parent-country
pairs (e.g. geographic distance) which may affect trade of the foreign affiliate with its parent
company, we re-estimate the benchmark model after replacing the affiliate-country dummies
and parent-country dummies with dummies for pairs of affiliate and parent countries. The
results, shown in Table 7, are very similar to the main ones in terms of sign, size and precision.
Similarly, the results do not change quantitatively and qualitatively when we estimate the
benchmark model with standard errors clustered by affiliate country and affiliate industry,
by affiliate country and parent country, as well as by affiliate country, affiliate industry and
parent country (Tables B8 to B10).
<< Table 7 about here >>
Similar to Corcos et al. (2013), we use as dependent variables in probit regressions dummies
indicating that imports from the parent and exports to the parent and/or sister affiliates
account for at least 25% and 75% of the foreign affiliate’s total production inputs and total
direct exports, respectively. As shown in Table 8, the main results remain largely unchanged.
Interestingly, we also find that older foreign affiliates are less likely to import at least 75% of
their production inputs from the parent company. A possible explanation for this result is
that older foreign affiliates develop local and international backward linkages with unaffiliated
parties or have the necessary know-how to produce inputs themselves which partly substitute
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for production inputs sourced from the parent.
<< Table 8 about here >>
In another exercise, we test the sensitivity of our main results to the use of alternative firm-
level variables as determinants of intra-firm trade. We first capture firm size with total sales
instead of total employment. Since labour productivity is computed as the ratio of total sales
to total employment, we drop it from these regressions in order to avoid multi-collinearity.
We also replace skill intensity with the average wage, computed as the ratio of total wage bill
to total permanent full-time employment, and with the wage gaps between non-production
and production workers, managerial and production workers, as well as between managerial
and non-production workers. The wage gaps between these worker types are calculated as
the ratios of the monthly wage for one worker type to the monthly wage for another. In
all three cases, we obtain very similar results to the main ones (Tables B11 to B13). We
also find that foreign affiliates which pay a higher average wage have a higher share of intra-
firm imports, while those which pay a higher monthly wage to managerial workers relative
to production workers are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports. Both findings are
consistent with international production hierarchies theories which stress that the supervisory
role of managers in foreign affiliates is crucial as it allows the MNC to save on communication
and monitoring costs (Antra`s et al., 2008). The main results also remain largely unchanged
when we replace the tax to sales ratio with the tax to assets ratio (Table B14).
As part of the same exercise, we replace the shares of finance of working capital from
various sources with five alternative sets of firm-level variables. The first alternative set
comprises the shares of finance of fixed assets from the same sources as of working capital.
The second and third alternative sets comprise dummies indicating whether foreign affiliates
have non-zero shares of working capital and fixed assets from each source examined. By and
large, we obtain very similar results to the main ones (Tables B15 to B17). Most importantly,
we find that foreign affiliates which have their parent as a source of finance of working capital
and fixed assets and those which have a higher share of finance of fixed assets from this source
are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports and have higher shares
of both intra-firm trade flows. The fourth set of firm-level variables comprises dummies
indicating the importance of parental assistance received by foreign affiliates in accessing
finance. In particular, these dummies indicate whether parental assistance was not received,
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was received but it was not important, was received and it was slightly important, important,
very important, and crucial. Since these dummies are mutually exclusive, we consider the
first dummy as the reference variable and exclude it from the regressions. In line with the
main results, we find that foreign affiliates which are importantly assisted by the parent in
order to access finance are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports, while those which are
crucially assisted by the parent in this respect are more likely to engage in intra-firm imports
and have a higher share of this intra-firm trade flow (Table B18).
Since capital goods, such as production machinery, are part of a firm’s working capital and
fixed assets, the fifth set of firm-level variables comprises dummies indicating four alternative
channels through which foreign affiliates acquire capital goods. The relevant question in the
questionnaire is addressed only to foreign affiliates in non-services industries and asks whether
capital goods are mostly imported directly by the company, acquired through distributors
in the affiliate country, imported through the parent company, or acquired from any other
source to be specified by the firm. As these choices are mutually exclusive, we choose the
fourth dummy to be the reference variable in regressions. Similar to the main findings, we
show that foreign affiliates which acquire capital goods from their parent are more likely to
engage in intra-firm imports and have a higher share of this intra-firm trade flow. Also,
foreign affiliates which acquire capital goods from local distributors are less likely to engage
in intra-firm exports (Table B19).
In Table 9, we show that the main results do not change quantitatively and qualitatively
when we re-estimate the benchmark regressions on a sample which comprises only goods-
producing industries (Atalay et al., 2014).17 The results remain largely unchanged also when
our estimating sample comprises only manufacturing industries (Table B20). Given that the
firm-level data employed in our empirical analysis correspond to 2009, only a year after the
eruption of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the subsequent global trade collapse
(Levchenko et al., 2010), the two types of foreign affiliates might have been hit dispropor-
tionately by these events. We control for the crisis effect in three ways. First, we augment
the benchmark model with dummies indicating whether the performance of the firm is well
below, below, in line with, above, and well above its expectations before the crisis. Second,
we incorporate similar dummies capturing firm performance as compared to revised expecta-
17Based on the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq id=182 – ac-
cessed June 13, 2017) and the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag06.htm#
about – accessed June 13, 2017), this sample comprises industries in agriculture (1–5), mining (10–14), manu-
facturing (15–39), and construction (45).
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tions after the crisis. In both cases, the dummies are mutually exclusive and therefore, we
choose those indicating firm performance well above expectations and revised expectations
before and after the crisis, respectively, as the reference variables. The results remain largely
unchanged, while the marginal effects and coefficient estimates of all additional dummies are
statistically insignificant (Tables B21 to B22).
<< Table 9 about here >>
As a third way of controlling for the crisis effect, we incorporate in the benchmark model
dummies indicating whether there was a decrease, an increase or no change in the average
capacity utilisation level of the firm during the crisis as compared to the last three years before
the crisis. By and large, the main results remain unchanged (Table B23). The marginal effects
of the additional dummies suggest that foreign affiliates which experienced no change or a
decrease in their average capacity utilisation during the crisis are less likely to engage in
intra-firm exports. Those with lower average capacity utilisation during the crisis also have a
lower share of intra-firm exports. Similar results on the better performance of foreign affiliates
during the recent crisis as compared to domestic firms with similar characteristics have been
documented by Alfaro and Chen (2012).
6 Conclusion
By exploiting a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa for the year 2009,
we uncover stylised facts on the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm and arm’s
length trade and identify the firm-level determinants of the first type of trade. Importantly,
the empirical evidence that we provide is consistent with a broad array of theories of the
MNC. Specifically, it is consistent with property rights and intangible assets theories, with
international production hierarchies theories, as well as with theories of different FDI types
and of multinational activity under credit constraints.
The descriptive statistics analysis reveals that foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade are
relatively few in the sample examined. Among foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade, the vast
majority of these also engage in arm’s length trade, which accounts for an important fraction
of their total trade. The econometric analysis reveals that the extensive and intensive margins
of intra-firm trade are higher in foreign affiliates of larger size and in foreign affiliates with
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higher productivity, skill intensity, intangible to tangible capital ratio, and share of finance of
working capital through the parent company. They are also higher in foreign affiliates whose
principal business scope is to access new markets, to access inputs, to lower production costs,
to export back to the home country, and to benefit from trade agreements.
The scarcity of foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade is an essential stylised fact which
calls for further investigation of multinational firm boundaries on the basis of their role in fa-
cilitating the transfer of intangibles (Arrow, 1969; Teece, 1977; Atalay et al., 2014). However,
our findings on intra-firm trade and intangible to tangible capital ratio suggest that emphasis
should be also put on their role in facilitating the transfer of intangible assets which accom-
panies the transfer of tangible goods (Simon, 1991; Grant, 1996). The other two stylised facts
on the presence of arm’s length trade in almost all foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade and
its significant share in their total trade are also essential, motivating further research on the
“make-or-buy” choice at each stage of the production process. Specifically, future theoreti-
cal and empirical work could focus on determinants of the internalisation choice such as the
position of each production stage in the value chain (Antra`s and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al.,
2016) and the degree of its input complexity (Corcos et al., 2013). The focus on the latter
determinant could be combined with suppliers’ capacity to access credit (Carluccio and Fally,
2012) and the risk of knowledge expropriation by them (Ethier and Markusen, 1996).
In addition, our findings on intra-firm trade and the principal business scope of foreign
affiliates encourage further theoretical and empirical research on complex FDI and complex
integrations strategies of MNCs. Finally, our robust evidence on the extensive and intensive
margins of intra-firm trade being determined by the intangible to tangible capital ratio of
foreign affiliates, as well as their share of finance of working capital from their parent company
and other sources would be nicely complemented with a similar analysis on foreign affiliates
located in countries with good contract enforcement and strong intellectual property rights,
as well as with well-developed capital markets.
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Tables with main descriptive statistics
Table 1: Trade activities of foreign affiliates
Trade activities No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Aggregate trade 209 12.5 1466 87.5 1675 100
– Intra-firm trade 940 64.1 526 35.9 1466 100
– Intra-firm trade only 509 96.8 17 3.2 526 100
– Intra-firm and arm’s length trade 17 3.2 509 96.8 526 100
– Arm’s length trade only 526 35.9 940 64.1 1466 100
Aggregate imports 144 9.8 1322 90.2 1466 100
– Intra-firm imports 909 69 409 31 1318 100
Aggregate exports 718 49 748 51 1466 100
– Intra-firm exports 414 66.7 207 33.3 621 100
Aggregate imports and exports 862 58.8 604 41.2 1466 100
– Intra-firm imports and exports 401 81.7 90 18.3 491 100
Aggregate imports only 748 51 718 49 1466 100
– Intra-firm imports only 510 71 208 29 718 100
Aggregate exports only 1322 90.2 144 9.8 1466 100
– Intra-firm exports only 89 70.6 37 29.4 126 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 2: Trade activities of foreign affiliates by affiliate sector
Panel A: Aggregate trade No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Agriculture 10 9 101 91 111 100
Mining 5 11.6 38 88.4 43 100
Manufacturing 140 12.7 962 87.3 1102 100
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 82 15.6 445 84.4 527 100
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 42 12.2 302 87.8 344 100
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 16 6.9 215 93.1 231 100
EGW and Construction 22 22.4 76 77.6 98 100
Services 32 10 289 90 321 100
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 8 26.7 22 73.3 30 100
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 24 8.2 267 91.8 291 100
Panel B: Intra-firm trade No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Agriculture 52 51.5 49 48.5 101 100
Mining 21 55.3 17 44.7 38 100
Manufacturing 630 65.5 332 34.5 962 100
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 292 65.6 153 34.4 445 100
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 199 65.9 103 34.1 302 100
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 139 64.7 76 35.3 215 100
EGW and Construction 48 63.2 28 36.8 76 100
Services 189 65.4 100 34.6 289 100
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 15 68.2 7 31.8 22 100
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 174 65.2 93 34.8 267 100
Panel C: Arm’s length trade only No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Agriculture 49 48.5 52 51.5 101 100
Mining 17 44.7 21 55.3 38 100
Manufacturing 332 34.5 630 65.5 962 100
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 153 34.4 292 65.6 445 100
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 103 34.1 199 65.9 302 100
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 76 35.3 139 64.7 215 100
EGW and Construction 28 36.8 48 63.2 76 100
Services 100 34.6 189 65.4 289 100
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 7 31.8 15 68.2 22 100
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 93 34.8 174 65.2 267 100.0
Panel D: Intra-firm trade only No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Agriculture 49 100 0 0 49 100
Mining 17 100 0 0 17 100
Manufacturing 315 94.9 17 5.1 332 100
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 149 97.4 4 2.6 153 100
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 92 89.3 11 10.7 103 100
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 74 97.4 2 2.6 76 100
EGW and Construction 28 100 0 0 28 100
Services 100 100 0 0 100 100
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 7 100 0 0 7 100
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 93 100 0 0 93 100
Panel E: Intra-firm and arm’s length trade No Yes Total
# % # % # %
Agriculture 0 0 49 100 49 100
Mining 0 0 17 100 17 100
Manufacturing 17 5.1 315 94.9 332 100
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 4 2.6 149 97.4 153 100
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 11 10.7 92 89.3 103 100
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 2 2.6 74 97.4 76 100
EGW and Construction 0 0 28 100 28 100
Services 0 0 100 100 100 100
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 0 0 7 100 7 100
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 0 0 93 100 93 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Sectors are defined on the basis of the ISIC Rev. 1.1. Agriculture (1–5); Mining
(10–14); Manufacturing (15–39); Resource-Based Manufacturing (15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27); Low-Tech
Manufacturing (17, 18, 19, 22, 28, 36); High- and Medium-Tech Manufacturing (24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 37, 38); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply and Construction (40 and 45); Services (50–99); Knowledge-
Intensive Services (61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85, 92); Less Knowledge-Intensive Services (50,
51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 75, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99).
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 3: Average shares of intra-firm and arm’s length trade by affiliate sector
intra-firm intra-firm arm’s length arm’s length
imports exports imports exports
(share) (share) (share) (share)
Sector # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean
Whole Economy 409 0.653 207 0.517 406 0.235 207 0.483
Agriculture 25 0.482 36 0.718 25 0.21 36 0.282
Mining 15 0.594 9 0.466 15 0.328 9 0.534
Manufacturing 243 0.652 158 0.48 241 0.218 158 0.52
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 100 0.579 80 0.428 99 0.241 80 0.572
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 85 0.717 49 0.585 85 0.187 49 0.415
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 58 0.685 29 0.447 57 0.224 29 0.553
EGW and Construction 27 0.6 2 0.185 27 0.322 2 0.815
Services 99 0.719 2 0.34 98 0.246 2 0.66
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 7 0.579 0 0 7 0.379 0 0
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 92 0.73 2 0.34 91 0.236 2 0.66
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Sectors are defined on the basis of the ISIC Rev. 1.1. Agriculture (1–5); Mining (10–14);
Manufacturing (15–39); Resource-Based Manufacturing (15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27); Low-Tech Manufacturing (17, 18, 19,
22, 28, 36); High- and Medium-Tech Manufacturing (24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
and Construction (40 and 45); Services (50–99); Knowledge-Intensive Services (61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85,
92); Less Knowledge-Intensive Services (50, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 75, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99).
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (non-dummy
variables)
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max
employment 1455 220 655 0 15887
productivity (thousand US$) 1424 21 337 0 11409
skill intensity 1425 0.18 0.15 0 1
intangible to tangible capital 1400 1.63 31.28 0 838
firm age 1458 19 17 1 142
tax to sales 1287 0.05 0.09 0 1
finance of working capital: internal funds (share) 1421 0.57 0.39 0 1
finance of working capital: borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 1416 0.17 0.27 0 1
finance of working capital: borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 1415 0.03 0.13 0 1
finance of working capital: borrow from family (share) 1414 0.02 0.12 0 1
finance of working capital: borrow from non-bank institutions (share) 1413 0.01 0.07 0 1
finance of working capital: purchases on credit/advances (share) 1414 0.08 0.19 0 1
finance of working capital: new equity/debt (share) 1412 0.01 0.06 0 1
finance of working capital: funds from parent company (share) 1415 0.08 0.24 0 1
finance of working capital: borrow from another source (share) 1405 0.01 0.10 0 1
Notes: Authors’ calculations. For the description of the variables, see Table 10.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
31
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (dummy vari-
ables)
Dummy variable No Yes Total
# % # % # %
majority-owned foreign affiliate (MOFA) 170 11.8 1272 88.2 1442 100
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 1224 84.8 219 15.2 1443 100
principal motive to invest: market access 412 28.7 1022 71.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: low-cost structure 1331 92.8 103 7.2 1434 100
principal motive to invest: input access 1329 92.7 105 7.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: join partner 1381 96.3 53 3.7 1434 100
principal motive to invest: export back home 1401 97.7 33 2.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: TA benefits 1391 97 43 3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: other 1359 94.8 75 5.2 1434 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Each dummy is equal to 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise.
For the description of the variables, see Table 10.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Tables with main empirical results
Table 6: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
property rights theory
employment 0.033** 0.019* 0.059*** 0.026*
[0.013] [0.011] [0.019] [0.014]
productivity 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.014
[0.0089] [0.0077] [0.013] [0.0091]
skill intensity 0.17* 0.17** -0.11 0.036
[0.093] [0.086] [0.17] [0.16]
intangible assets theory
intangible to tangible capital 0.00059*** 0.00014 0.0016*** 0.00066**
[0.00021] [0.00013] [0.00030] [0.00028]
affiliate-parent ties
MOFA 0.013 -0.014 -0.066 -0.0024
[0.046] [0.037] [0.054] [0.042]
firm age 0.00096 -0.00099 0.00031 -0.00038
[0.00089] [0.00071] [0.0012] [0.0010]
resource-based theory
M&As -0.017 -0.0038 0.067 0.037
[0.038] [0.030] [0.050] [0.043]
FDI types
market access 0.29*** 0.15*** 0.11 0.055
[0.090] [0.036] [0.087] [0.058]
low cost 0.26** 0.16*** 0.12 0.062
[0.10] [0.052] [0.10] [0.076]
input access 0.25** 0.10* 0.14 0.081
[0.11] [0.055] [0.10] [0.074]
join partner 0.27** 0.12* -0.26* -0.088
[0.11] [0.066] [0.14] [0.070]
export back home 0.15 0.078 0.33* 0.11
[0.12] [0.070] [0.18] [0.20]
TA benefits 0.19* 0.12* 0.055 0.023
[0.12] [0.067] [0.17] [0.086]
transfer pricing
tax to sales 0.10 -0.087 0.22 0.019
[0.16] [0.14] [0.20] [0.14]
access to credit
internal funds (share) 0.19* 0.094 0.043 -0.15
[0.11] [0.067] [0.16] [0.14]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.089 0.023 0.041 -0.19
[0.12] [0.074] [0.17] [0.15]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.12 0.025 0.32 -0.059
[0.15] [0.12] [0.20] [0.15]
borrow from family (share) 0.19 0.055 0.14 -0.11
[0.16] [0.11] [0.25] [0.18]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.33* 0.11 -1.78** -0.48***
[0.18] [0.14] [0.77] [0.19]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.25** 0.14 0.082 -0.014
[0.13] [0.097] [0.19] [0.16]
new equity/debt (share) 0.25 0.47* 0.29 -0.25
[0.29] [0.25] [0.38] [0.23]
funds from parent company (share) 0.66*** 0.51*** 0.62*** 0.27*
[0.12] [0.088] [0.18] [0.15]
borrow from another source (share) 0.20 0.14 -0.17 -0.15
[0.19] [0.16] [0.32] [0.19]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.2 -189.2
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table 10.
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Table 7: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (affiliate-parent-country dummies in lieu
of affiliate-country and parent-country dummies)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.045*** 0.023* 0.046* 0.025
[0.015] [0.013] [0.025] [0.018]
productivity 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.040** 0.015
[0.011] [0.0094] [0.018] [0.012]
skill intensity 0.14 0.097 -0.13 0.11
[0.11] [0.11] [0.24] [0.20]
intangible to tangible capital 0.00087*** 0.00019 0.0014*** 0.00057*
[0.00025] [0.00014] [0.00031] [0.00030]
MOFA 0.020 -0.016 -0.0081 0.020
[0.059] [0.047] [0.083] [0.051]
firm age 0.00097 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.00035
[0.0010] [0.00083] [0.0014] [0.0013]
M&As -0.036 -0.0041 0.14* 0.047
[0.046] [0.036] [0.079] [0.059]
market access 0.24** 0.11*** 0.23 0.094
[0.10] [0.043] [0.15] [0.067]
low cost 0.23** 0.091 0.37** 0.13
[0.12] [0.062] [0.17] [0.081]
input access 0.19 0.069 0.30* 0.11
[0.12] [0.062] [0.17] [0.085]
join partner 0.34*** 0.14* . -0.11
[0.13] [0.083] . [0.096]
export back home 0.078 0.022 0.71** 0.40
[0.14] [0.085] [0.29] [0.26]
TA benefits 0.024 0.023 0.12 0.085
[0.13] [0.073] [0.25] [0.10]
tax to sales 0.053 -0.21 0.23 0.023
[0.18] [0.18] [0.22] [0.20]
internal funds (share) 0.21* 0.11 0.16 -0.17
[0.12] [0.089] [0.20] [0.14]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.15 0.079 0.17 -0.26*
[0.13] [0.098] [0.22] [0.15]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.12 0.066 0.41 -0.17
[0.19] [0.15] [0.25] [0.19]
borrow from family (share) 0.28 0.16 0.036 -0.27
[0.18] [0.14] [0.36] [0.25]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.29 0.16 -0.96* -0.42**
[0.21] [0.15] [0.52] [0.20]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.28** 0.21* 0.056 -0.085
[0.14] [0.12] [0.25] [0.16]
new equity/debt (share) 0.59** 0.73*** -0.73 -0.25
[0.26] [0.25] [0.52] [0.33]
funds from parent company (share) 0.77*** 0.52*** 0.79*** 0.22
[0.14] [0.11] [0.23] [0.15]
borrow from another source (share) 0.29 0.20 -0.12 -0.23
[0.20] [0.18] [0.42] [0.22]
Obs 762 1048 289 501
Pseudo−R2 0.24 0.29
Log − likelihood -360.4 -136.4
R2 0.15 0.29
Affiliate-country dummies No No No No
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies No No No No
Affiliate-parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-parent-country and affiliate-industry dummies in odd-numbered and even-numbered
columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent
variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated
across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table 10.
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Table 8: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (intra-firm trade share threshold)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
≥ 25% ≥ 75% ≥ 25% ≥ 25%
employment 0.034*** 0.011 0.0096 0.011
[0.012] [0.0098] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.016 0.013
[0.0084] [0.0071] [0.013] [0.014]
skill intensity 0.15* 0.16** -0.073 0.11
[0.087] [0.072] [0.16] [0.14]
intangible to tangible capital 0.00063*** -0.0077 0.0012*** 0.00064***
[0.00020] [0.0060] [0.00020] [0.00015]
MOFA -0.019 -0.054 -0.13*** -0.0089
[0.043] [0.036] [0.052] [0.050]
firm age -0.0013 -0.0017** -0.000039 -0.00018
[0.00090] [0.00077] [0.0011] [0.0010]
M&As -0.028 0.0056 0.0093 0.10**
[0.037] [0.030] [0.045] [0.051]
market access 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.095
[0.093] [0.079] [0.081] [0.074]
low cost 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.22** 0.072
[0.10] [0.085] [0.093] [0.087]
input access 0.23** 0.21** 0.24** 0.058
[0.11] [0.091] [0.095] [0.094]
join partner 0.29*** 0.18** -0.19 -0.17
[0.11] [0.089] [0.13] [0.15]
export back home 0.28** 0.12 0.21 0.0058
[0.12] [0.10] [0.18] [0.17]
TA benefits 0.22** 0.15 0.30** 0.16
[0.11] [0.10] [0.13] [0.11]
tax to sales -0.043 -0.29* 0.15 -0.36
[0.17] [0.16] [0.17] [0.36]
internal funds (share) 0.15* 0.044 -0.24* -0.34***
[0.092] [0.073] [0.14] [0.11]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.065 -0.029 -0.36** -0.46***
[0.10] [0.083] [0.15] [0.14]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.060 0.019 0.020 -0.37***
[0.14] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13]
borrow from family (share) 0.045 0.077 -0.12 -0.17
[0.15] [0.12] [0.25] [0.20]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.099 0.084 -4.02* .
[0.17] [0.13] [2.06] .
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.18 0.14 -0.15 -0.15
[0.11] [0.090] [0.16] [0.14]
new equity/debt (share) 0.39 0.44*** 0.029 -0.11
[0.25] [0.17] [0.41] [0.30]
funds from parent company (share) 0.53*** 0.32*** 0.21 -0.026
[0.10] [0.080] [0.15] [0.12]
borrow from another source (share) 0.14 0.13 -0.42 -0.47
[0.18] [0.15] [0.34] [0.32]
Obs 966 941 391 278
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.43
Log − likelihood -413.7 -304.6 -141.8 -73.9
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1
if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs.
Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in all columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table 10.
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Table 9: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (sample of firms in goods-producing
industries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.020 0.018 0.060*** 0.025*
[0.014] [0.012] [0.019] [0.014]
productivity 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.014
[0.010] [0.0089] [0.014] [0.0091]
skill intensity 0.073 0.21* -0.11 0.034
[0.13] [0.11] [0.17] [0.16]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0068 0.00020* 0.0016*** 0.00066**
[0.0064] [0.00012] [0.00030] [0.00028]
MOFA 0.049 0.020 -0.059 -0.0060
[0.050] [0.039] [0.055] [0.042]
firm age 0.0014 -0.00091 0.00029 -0.00036
[0.00098] [0.00078] [0.0012] [0.0010]
M&As 0.0048 0.013 0.067 0.037
[0.041] [0.032] [0.050] [0.043]
market access 0.27*** 0.15*** 0.11 0.056
[0.085] [0.038] [0.086] [0.058]
low cost 0.22** 0.16*** 0.13 0.060
[0.10] [0.058] [0.10] [0.076]
input access 0.24** 0.097* 0.14 0.081
[0.099] [0.057] [0.10] [0.073]
join partner 0.27** 0.084 -0.26* -0.089
[0.11] [0.078] [0.14] [0.070]
export back home 0.27* 0.17 0.34* 0.11
[0.14] [0.11] [0.18] [0.20]
TA benefits 0.19* 0.13** 0.055 0.023
[0.11] [0.068] [0.17] [0.086]
tax to sales 0.11 -0.10 0.22 0.019
[0.18] [0.17] [0.20] [0.14]
internal funds (share) 0.20* 0.11 0.048 -0.15
[0.11] [0.071] [0.16] [0.14]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.11 0.053 0.047 -0.19
[0.13] [0.079] [0.17] [0.14]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.10 0.015 0.32 -0.061
[0.17] [0.13] [0.20] [0.15]
borrow from family (share) 0.28* 0.18 0.17 -0.12
[0.17] [0.15] [0.26] [0.18]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.084 0.15 -1.81** -0.48***
[0.21] [0.15] [0.79] [0.18]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.27* 0.17 0.094 -0.020
[0.14] [0.11] [0.19] [0.16]
new equity/debt (share) 0.0052 0.33 0.29 -0.25
[0.37] [0.36] [0.38] [0.23]
funds from parent company (share) 0.65*** 0.51*** 0.61*** 0.27*
[0.13] [0.094] [0.18] [0.15]
borrow from another source (share) 0.23 0.15 -0.17 -0.16
[0.19] [0.17] [0.32] [0.19]
Obs 764 826 430 495
Pseudo−R2 0.23 0.32
Log − likelihood -347.9 -188.8
R2 0.15 0.28
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and
even-numbered columns, respectively. Sample restricted to foreign affiliates in goods-producing industries. Dummies take value 1 if
the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy
covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed
in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Appendix: Additional descriptive statistics
Table A1: Foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm trade by affiliate industry
With intra-firm trade
No Yes Total
ISIC Rev. 1.1 Name # % # % # %
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 46 51.1 44 48.9 90 100
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 3 75 1 25 4 100
5 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing 3 42.9 4 57.1 7 100
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 8 80 2 20 10 100
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 1 20 4 80 5 100
13 Mining of metal ores 6 66.7 3 33.3 9 100
14 Other mining and quarrying 6 42.9 8 57.1 14 100
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 111 64.2 62 35.8 173 100
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 10 62.5 6 37.5 16 100
17 Manufacture of textiles 22 61.1 14 38.9 36 100
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 36 47.4 40 52.6 76 100
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 19 73.1 7 26.9 26 100
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 21 77.8 6 22.2 27 100
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 75 7 25 28 100
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 18 69.2 8 30.8 26 100
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 4 57.1 3 42.9 7 100
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 80 65 43 35 123 100
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 74 62.2 45 37.8 119 100
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 28 66.7 14 33.3 42 100
27 Manufacture of basic metals 23 69.7 10 30.3 33 100
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 71 78 20 22 91 100
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 17 58.6 12 41.4 29 100
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 14 66.7 7 33.3 21 100
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 4 66.7 2 33.3 6 100
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 6 85.7 1 14.3 7 100
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 8 61.5 5 38.5 13 100
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 3 60 2 40 5 100
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 33 70.2 14 29.8 47 100
37 Recycling 2 50 2 50 4 100
38 Other manufacturing 4 100 0 0 4 100
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 9 100 0 0 9 100
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 0 0 1 100 1 100
45 Construction 39 59.1 27 40.9 66 100
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 31 66 16 34 47 100
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 92 68.1 43 31.9 135 100
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods 51 60.7 33 39.3 84 100
61 Water transport 1 100 0 0 1 100
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 0 0 1 100 1 100
64 Post and telecommunications 2 100 0 0 2 100
70 Real estate activities 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 0 0 1 100 1 100
72 Computer and related activities 2 66.7 1 33.3 3 100
74 Other business activities 8 80 2 20 10 100
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1 50 1 50 2 100
Total 940 64.1 526 35.9 1466 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A2: Foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm trade by affiliate country
Affiliate country without intra-firm trade with intra-firm trade Total
# % # % # %
Burkina Faso 8 57.1 6 42.9 14 100
Burundi 11 68.8 5 31.3 16 100
Cameroon 39 56.5 30 43.5 69 100
Cape Verde 24 52.2 22 47.8 46 100
Ethiopia 71 74.7 24 25.3 95 100
Ghana 88 73.9 31 26.1 119 100
Kenya 140 60.6 91 39.4 231 100
Lesotho 42 65.6 22 34.4 64 100
Madagascar 37 57.8 27 42.2 64 100
Malawi 15 51.7 14 48.3 29 100
Mali 30 69.8 13 30.2 43 100
Mozambique 81 83.5 16 16.5 97 100
Niger 6 60 4 40 10 100
Nigeria 51 63 30 37 81 100
Rwanda 24 57.1 18 42.9 42 100
Senegal 28 54.9 23 45.1 51 100
Tanzania 47 52.8 42 47.2 89 100
Uganda 159 65.2 85 34.8 244 100
Zambia 39 62.9 23 37.1 62 100
Total 940 64.1 526 35.9 1466 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A3: Foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm trade by parent country and affiliate
sector
Parent country without intra-firm trade with intra-firm trade Total
# % # % # %
Whole Economy
High-Income Countries 422 61.4 265 38.6 687 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 373 68.8 169 31.2 542 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 112 60.9 72 39.1 184 100
Agriculture
High-Income Countries 31 47 35 53 66 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 11 64.7 6 35.3 17 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 8 57.1 6 42.9 14 100
Mining
High-Income Countries 8 50 8 50 16 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 12 63.2 7 36.8 19 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufacturing
High-Income Countries 282 63.5 162 36.5 444 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 255 68.7 116 31.3 371 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 70 62.5 42 37.5 112 100
Resource-Based Manufacturing
High-Income Countries 128 62.1 78 37.9 206 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 119 71.7 47 28.3 166 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 35 59.3 24 40.7 59 100
Low-Tech Manufacturing
High-Income Countries 88 71 36 29 124 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 81 60.4 53 39.6 134 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 21 67.7 10 32.3 31 100
High- and Medium-Tech manufacturing
High-Income Countries 66 57.9 48 42.1 114 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 55 77.5 16 22.5 71 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 14 63.6 8 36.4 22 100
EGW Supply and Construction
High-Income Countries 26 65 14 35 40 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 10 50 10 50 20 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 9 69.2 4 30.8 13 100
Services
High-Income Countries 75 62 46 38 121 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 85 73.9 30 26.1 115 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 25 55.6 20 44.4 45 100
Knowledge-Intensive Services
High-Income Countries 9 69.2 4 30.8 13 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 3 100 0 0 3 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 3 75 1 25 4 100
Less Knowledge-Intensive Services
High-Income Countries 66 61.1 42 38.9 108 100
Low/Middle-Income Countries 82 73.2 30 26.8 112 100
Sub-Saharan African Countries 22 53.7 19 46.3 41 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Parent countries classified as high-income or low/middle-income outside Sub-Saharan Africa
according to the World Bank Historical Country Classification for the year 2010 which comprises four country groups:
high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income, low-income. Sectors are defined on the basis of the ISIC Rev. 1.1.
Agriculture (1–5); Mining (10–14); Manufacturing (15–39); Resource-Based Manufacturing (15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27);
Low-Tech Manufacturing (17, 18, 19, 22, 28, 36); High- and Medium-Tech Manufacturing (24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37,
38); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply and Construction (40 and 45); Services (50–99); Knowledge-Intensive Services (61,
62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85, 92); Less Knowledge-Intensive Services (50, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 75, 90, 91, 93,
95, 99).
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A4: Average shares of intra-firm and arm’s length trade by sector (indirect imports
excluded from arm’s length imports)
intra-firm intra-firm arm’s length arm’s length
imports exports imports exports
(share) (share) (share) (share)
Sector # Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean
Whole Economy 409 0.653 207 0.517 406 0.182 207 0.483
Agriculture 25 0.482 36 0.718 25 0.169 36 0.282
Mining 15 0.594 9 0.466 15 0.236 9 0.534
Manufacturing 243 0.652 158 0.48 241 0.154 158 0.52
– Resource-Based Manufacturing 100 0.579 80 0.428 99 0.18 80 0.572
– Low-Tech Manufacturing 85 0.717 49 0.585 85 0.129 49 0.415
– High/Medium-Tech Manufacturing 58 0.685 29 0.447 57 0.146 29 0.553
EGW and Construction 27 0.6 2 0.185 27 0.265 2 0.815
Services 99 0.719 2 0.34 98 0.224 2 0.66
– Knowledge-Intensive Services 7 0.579 0 0 7 0.314 0 0
– Less Knowledge-Intensive Services 92 0.73 2 0.340 91 0.217 2 0.66
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Sectors are defined on the basis of the ISIC Rev. 1.1. Agriculture (1–5); Mining (10–14);
Manufacturing (15–39); Resource-Based Manufacturing (15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27); Low-Tech Manufacturing (17, 18, 19,
22, 28, 36); High- and Medium-Tech Manufacturing (24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
and Construction (40 and 45); Services (50–99); Knowledge-Intensive Services (61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85,
92); Less Knowledge-Intensive Services (50, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 75, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99).
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics for additional firm–level dummy variables (robustness checks)
Panel A: Firm-level
Dummy variable No Yes Total
# % # % # %
finance of working capital: internal funds 263 18.5 1158 81.5 1421 100
finance of working capital: borrow from affiliate-country banks 828 58.5 588 41.5 1416 100
finance of working capital: borrow from affiliate-country banks 1293 91.4 122 8.6 1415 100
finance of working capital: borrow from family 1317 93.1 97 6.9 1414 100
finance of working capital: borrow from non-bank institutions 1365 96.6 48 3.4 1413 100
finance of working capital: purchases on credit/advances 1119 79.1 295 20.9 1414 100
finance of working capital: new equity/debt 1381 97.8 31 2.2 1412 100
finance of working capital: funds from parent company 1233 87.1 182 12.9 1415 100
finance of working capital: borrow from another source 1360 96.8 45 3.2 1405 100
finance of fixed assets: internal funds 319 23 1069 77 1388 100
finance of fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks 867 62.5 520 37.5 1387 100
finance of fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks 1263 91.3 121 8.7 1384 100
finance of fixed assets: borrow from family 1299 93.9 85 6.1 1384 100
finance of fixed assets: borrow from non-bank institutions 1351 97.7 32 2.3 1383 100
finance of fixed assets: purchases on credit/advances 1261 91 124 9 1385 100
finance of fixed assets: new equity/debt 1364 98.6 20 1.4 1384 100
finance of fixed assets: funds from parent company 1204 87 180 13 1384 100
finance of fixed assets: borrow from another source 1330 96.9 43 3.1 1373 100
access to finance: parental assistance not received 1359 95.5 64 4.5 1423 100
access to finance: received parental assistance unimportant 1366 96 57 4 1423 100
access to finance: received parental assistance slightly important 1339 94.1 84 5.9 1423 100
access to finance: received parental assistance important 1115 78.4 308 21.6 1423 100
access to finance: received parental assistance very important 900 63.2 523 36.8 1423 100
access to finance: received parental assistance crucial 1036 72.8 387 27.2 1423 100
source of capital goods (imports) 306 26.8 837 73.2 1143 100
source of capital goods (local) 1013 88.6 130 11.4 1143 100
source of capital goods (parent) 988 86.4 155 13.6 1143 100
pre-crisis performance well below expectations 1418 97.4 38 2.6 1456 100
pre-crisis performance below expectations 1287 88.4 169 11.6 1456 100
pre-crisis performance in line with expectations 774 53.2 682 46.8 1456 100
pre-crisis performance above expectations 984 67.6 472 32.4 1456 100
pre-crisis performance well above expectations 1361 93.5 95 6.5 1456 100
post-crisis performance well below expectations 1373 94.2 84 5.8 1457 100
post-crisis performance below expectations 1093 75 364 25 1457 100
post-crisis performance in line with expectations 798 54.8 659 45.2 1457 100
post-crisis performance above expectations 1153 79.1 304 20.9 1457 100
post-crisis performance well above expectations 1411 96.8 46 3.2 1457 100
post-crisis capacity utilisation: no change 710 61.5 445 38.5 1155 100
post-crisis capacity utilisation: decrease 543 47 612 53 1155 100
post-crisis capacity utilisation: increase 1057 91.5 98 8.5 1155 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Each dummy is equal to 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. For the description of
the variables, see Table B24.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A6: Descriptive statistics for additional firm-level non-dummy variables (robustness
checks)
Panel A: Firm-level
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max
sales (million US$) 1434 2 25 0 552
average wage (thousand US$) 1386 5 152 0 5569
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 1275 2.71 3.67 0 67
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) 1274 3.97 4.24 0 69
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 1315 2.07 2.08 0 23
finance of fixed assets: internal funds (share) 1388 0.56 0.41 0 1
finance of fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 1387 0.19 0.31 0 1
finance of fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 1384 0.03 0.13 0 1
finance of fixed assets: borrow from family (share) 1384 0.03 0.13 0 1
finance of fixed assets: borrow from non-bank institutions (share) 1383 0.01 0.07 0 1
finance of fixed assets: purchases on credit/advances (share) 1385 0.03 0.14 0 1
finance of fixed assets: new equity/debt (share) 1384 0.01 0.08 0 1
finance of fixed assets: funds from parent company (share) 1384 0.09 0.25 0 1
finance of fixed assets: borrow from another source (share) 1373 0.02 0.12 0 1
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The data on capital and skill abundance and on legal rights strength in parent countries correspond to
the year 2009. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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B Appendix: Robustness checks
Table B1: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade by type of determinant
Panel A: Employment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.003 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.009] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 1188 1265 508 592
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.17
Log − likelihood -649.3 -274.8
R2 0.088 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Productivity (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
productivity 0.03 0.02*** 0.03** 0.008
. [0.007] [0.01] [0.009]
Obs 1160 1234 504 583
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.16
Log − likelihood -626.5 -276.5
R2 0.093 0.20
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Skill intensity (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
skill intensity 0.2 0.2*** -0.1 0.008
. [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
Obs 1165 1240 502 583
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.16
Log − likelihood -633.1 -275.6
R2 0.093 0.20
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intangible to tangible capital (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
intangible to tangible capital 0.0007** 0.0002 0.01 0.0007**
[0.0003] [0.0001] [0.03] [0.0003]
Obs 1146 1222 498 581
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.16
Log − likelihood -622.7 -275.6
R2 0.081 0.20
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel E: Majority foreign ownership (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
MOFA 0.02 0.007 -0.02 0.02
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
Obs 1184 1261 506 590
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.16
Log − likelihood -650.3 -279.2
R2 0.086 0.20
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade by type of determinant (continued)
Panel F: Firm age (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
firm age 0.002* -0.0005 0.002 0.00005
[0.0008] [0.0006] [0.001] [0.0009]
Obs 1193 1269 511 596
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.16
Log − likelihood -655.4 -281.9
R2 0.087 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel G: Mergers and acquisitions (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
M&As -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
Obs 1183 1260 509 596
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.15
Log − likelihood -649.3 -281.1
R2 0.085 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel H: Tax to sales (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
tax to sales 0.2 -0.08 0.10 -0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
Obs 1054 1132 457 537
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.14
Log − likelihood -569.1 -253.7
R2 0.085 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel I: Principal motive to invest (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.2*** 0.1**
[0.08] [0.04] [0.09] [0.05]
low cost 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.2** 0.1*
[0.09] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
input access 0.2*** 0.1** 0.2** 0.1*
[0.09] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3*** 0.1* 0.02 0.006
[0.10] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.06 0.5*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2** 0.1** 0.2 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.09]
Obs 1176 1253 508 593
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.18
Log − likelihood -640.7 -274.2
R2 0.094 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade by type of determinant (continued)
Panel J: Shares of finance of working capital (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
internal funds (share) 0.1 0.06 -0.06 -0.2
[0.10] [0.06] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.03 -0.03 -0.001 -0.2*
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.08 0.05 0.1 -0.09
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.05 -0.02 -0.3 -0.2
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.1]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.2 0.04 -1.2*** -0.4***
[0.2] [0.1] [0.4] [0.1]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2 0.09 -0.03 -0.08
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
new equity/debt (share) -0.00003 0.09 0.10 -0.3
[0.2] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.4** 0.2*
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.1]
Obs 1152 1227 498 575
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.22
Log − likelihood -583.6 -251.1
R2 0.16 0.26
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B2: Firm-level determinants of the extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports imports imports imports imports imports
(dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy)
employment 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
productivity 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0007*** 0.0006***
[0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]
MOFA 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
firm age 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
M&As -0.09** -0.07* -0.06 -0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.09]
low cost 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3**
[0.09] [0.10] [0.1]
input access 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3**
[0.09] [0.10] [0.1]
join partner 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3**
[0.10] [0.1] [0.1]
export back home 0.07 0.1 0.2
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
TA benefits 0.2** 0.2* 0.2*
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
tax to sales 0.07 0.1
[0.2] [0.2]
internal funds (share) 0.2*
[0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09
[0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1
[0.2]
borrow from family (share) 0.2
[0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3*
[0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3**
[0.1]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2
[0.3]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7***
[0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2
[0.2]
Obs 1141 1120 1108 1100 1087 993 971
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.22
Log − likelihood -609.0 -590.9 -581.3 -573.1 -558.0 -506.7 -458.2
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0
otherwise. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in all columns.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B3: Firm-level determinants of the intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports imports imports imports imports imports
(share) (share) (share) (share) (share) (share) (share)
employment 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 0.02 0.02*
[0.010] [0.010] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
productivity 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
MOFA 0.01 0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.01
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
firm age -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.0010
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
M&As -0.06** -0.04 -0.03 -0.004
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
market access 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
low cost 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
input access 0.1** 0.1*** 0.1*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
join partner 0.1* 0.1** 0.1*
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
export back home 0.03 0.07 0.08
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
TA benefits 0.2** 0.1** 0.1*
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
tax to sales -0.1 -0.09
[0.1] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.09
[0.07]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.02
[0.07]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.02
[0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.06
[0.1]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.1
[0.1]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.1
[0.10]
new equity/debt (share) 0.5*
[0.3]
funds from parent company (share) 0.5***
[0.09]
borrow from another source (share) 0.1
[0.2]
Obs 1214 1193 1180 1172 1159 1069 1048
R2 0.093 0.097 0.095 0.093 0.10 0.095 0.16
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and
0 otherwise. The dependent variable is not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B4: Firm-level determinants of the extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
exports exports exports exports exports exports exports
(dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy) (dummy)
employment 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
skill intensity -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.0005] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05]
firm age 0.0005 0.0004 -0.00002 -0.0003 0.0003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
market access 0.2** 0.2* 0.1
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
low cost 0.2* 0.1 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
input access 0.2 0.2* 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
join partner -0.07 -0.2* -0.3*
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
export back home 0.5** 0.3* 0.3*
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.1 0.03 0.06
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2]
tax to sales 0.2 0.2
[0.2] [0.2]
internal funds (share) 0.04
[0.2]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.04
[0.2]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.3
[0.2]
borrow from family (share) 0.1
[0.3]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) -1.8**
[0.8]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.08
[0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.3
[0.4]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6***
[0.2]
borrow from another source (share) -0.2
[0.3]
Obs 498 490 486 485 483 439 432
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.32
Log − likelihood -265.6 -260.9 -257.8 -257.3 -250.0 -225.9 -189.2
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0
otherwise. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in all columns.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B5: Firm-level determinants of the intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
exports exports exports exports exports exports exports
(share) (share) (share) (share) (share) (share) (share)
employment 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.01 0.01
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006* 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007*** 0.0007**
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.04 0.04 0.008 -0.003 -0.002
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
firm age -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004
[0.0009] [0.0010] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
market access 0.1** 0.09 0.06
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
low cost 0.1* 0.09 0.06
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
input access 0.1 0.1 0.08
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
join partner -0.008 -0.06 -0.09
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
export back home 0.3* 0.2 0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.10 0.007 0.02
[0.09] [0.08] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.05 0.02
[0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) -0.1
[0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) -0.2
[0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) -0.06
[0.1]
borrow from family (share) -0.1
[0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) -0.5***
[0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) -0.01
[0.2]
new equity/debt (share) -0.2
[0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.3*
[0.2]
borrow from another source (share) -0.2
[0.2]
Obs 575 569 562 561 557 511 501
R2 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and
0 otherwise. The dependent variable is not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B6: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (tax to sales ratio dropped)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.04*** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.03*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.010
[0.008] [0.007] [0.01] [0.008]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2*** -0.2 -0.02
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA -0.010 -0.02 -0.03 0.005
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.0009 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0003
[0.0008] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.05
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.1* 0.08
[0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.05]
low cost 0.2** 0.1** 0.2 0.1
[0.09] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
input access 0.2** 0.08 0.1 0.07
[0.09] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.2** 0.09 -0.10 -0.05
[0.10] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.07 0.02 0.5*** 0.3
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2** 0.1* 0.08 0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.1 -0.1
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.08 0.007 0.1 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09 0.0008 0.3 -0.05
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.03 0.04 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3* 0.1 -1.6*** -0.4***
[0.2] [0.1] [0.6] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3** 0.1 0.2 0.02
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.7*** 0.3**
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.07 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 1064 1135 474 546
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.31
Log − likelihood -502.1 -212.8
R2 0.17 0.28
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B7: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (marginal effects calculated at covari-
ates’ means)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.04** 0.02* 0.08*** 0.03*
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01
[0.01] [0.008] [0.02] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.2* 0.2** -0.2 0.04
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0007*** 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.002
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.04]
firm age 0.001 -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0004
[0.001] [0.0007] [0.002] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.004 0.09 0.04
[0.05] [0.03] [0.07] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.04] [0.1] [0.06]
low cost 0.3** 0.2*** 0.2 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.2 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.4* -0.09
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.5* 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.3] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.08 0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.3 0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.06 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.06 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.4 -0.06
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.06 0.2 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.4* 0.1 -2.5** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.1] [1.1] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3** 0.1 0.1 -0.01
[0.2] [0.10] [0.3] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.3 0.5* 0.4 -0.2
[0.4] [0.3] [0.5] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.8*** 0.5*** 0.9*** 0.3*
[0.2] [0.09] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.2 -189.2
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated at covariates’ means are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B8: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (clustered standard errors by affiliate-
country and affiliate-industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.03*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05** 0.01
[0.010] [0.009] [0.02] [0.01]
skill intensity 0.2* 0.2** -0.1 0.04
[0.10] [0.09] [0.1] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.002
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05]
firm age 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0004
[0.0009] [0.0006] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.004 0.07 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.09] [0.03] [0.10] [0.06]
low cost 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.09] [0.07]
input access 0.3** 0.1 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3** -0.09
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.06]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3 0.1
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.06 0.02
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.2 0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.04 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.3* -0.06
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.06 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3 0.1 -1.8** -0.5**
[0.2] [0.1] [0.8] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3* 0.1 0.08 -0.01
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.3 -0.2
[0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.2 -189.2
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-country clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country clustered standard errors No No No No
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on clustered standard errors by affiliate country and affiliate industry. For the description of the variables,
see Table B24.
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Table B9: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (clustered standard errors by affiliate-
country and parent-country)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02 0.06*** 0.03
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05** 0.01
[0.008] [0.009] [0.02] [0.01]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2** -0.1 0.04
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.002
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0004
[0.001] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.004 0.07 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.10] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.3** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.09]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3* -0.09
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3 0.1
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1** 0.06 0.02
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.1]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.2 0.02
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.04 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.3 -0.06
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.06 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3* 0.1 -1.8** -0.5**
[0.2] [0.1] [0.7] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3* 0.1 0.08 -0.01
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.3 -0.2
[0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.2 -189.2
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-country clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry clustered standard errors No No No No
Parent-country clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on clustered standard errors by affiliate country and parent country. For the description of the variables,
see Table B24.
54
Table B10: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (clustered standard errors by affiliate-
country, affiliate-industry and parent-country)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.03*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.02] [0.010]
skill intensity 0.2* 0.2** -0.1 0.04
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.002
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0004
[0.0010] [0.0007] [0.002] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.004 0.07 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.10] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.3** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3* -0.09
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3* 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.06 0.02
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.2 0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.04 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.3 -0.06
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.06 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3* 0.1 -1.8** -0.5**
[0.2] [0.1] [0.8] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3* 0.1 0.08 -0.01
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.3 -0.2
[0.3] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.2 -189.2
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-country clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on clustered standard errors by affiliate country, affiliate industry and parent country. For the description
of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B11: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (total sales in lieu of total employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
sales 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02**
[0.007] [0.006] [0.01] [0.008]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2** -0.1 0.004
[0.09] [0.08] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.006
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.0009 -0.001 0.0004 -0.0003
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.0010]
M&As -0.02 -0.006 0.07 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.05
[0.09] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.3** 0.2*** 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3** -0.10
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3* 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.05 0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.2 0.03
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.10 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.3 -0.06
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.06 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3* 0.1 -1.8** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.1] [0.8] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3** 0.1 0.08 -0.02
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.3 -0.2
[0.3] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.32
Log − likelihood -458.3 -189.3
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B12: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (average wage in lieu of skill intensity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.01 0.07*** 0.02*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02**
[0.01] [0.008] [0.01] [0.01]
average wage 0.02 0.02* 0.03 -0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.0008 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0003
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.002 0.04 0.02
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.1 0.05
[0.09] [0.04] [0.10] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.2*** 0.1 0.05
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.2** 0.09 0.2 0.04
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3** -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3* 0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.1 0.08 0.2 0.07
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.10]
tax to sales -0.01 -0.2 0.4 0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
internal funds (share) 0.2 0.07 -0.01 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.06 -0.005 -0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.07 -0.010 0.2 -0.09
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.05 0.2 -0.08
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.1 0.1 -2.5** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.2] [1.1] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2* 0.1 0.01 -0.05
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.2 -0.2
[0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.2
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 940 1022 425 491
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.33
Log − likelihood -443.7 -184.1
R2 0.15 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B13: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (relative monthly wage for production,
non-production and managerial workers in lieu of skill intensity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.04*** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.01]
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.01] [0.004]
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) 0.008* 0.003 -0.002 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005]
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) -0.02 -0.006 0.01 0.007
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0007*** 0.0002** 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.001 -0.05 -0.02
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05]
firm age 0.001 -0.0009 0.00009 0.000006
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.07
[0.09] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.1** 0.09 0.04
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3*** 0.1* 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.2** 0.10 -0.3* -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2* 0.1 0.3 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.09
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.1]
tax to sales 0.2 -0.10 0.2 0.006
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
internal funds (share) 0.1 0.05 0.04 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.03 -0.002 0.06 -0.2
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.05 0.02 0.3 -0.10
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from family (share) 0.06 0.03 0.2 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.2 0.2 -1.6** -0.5**
[0.2] [0.2] [0.6] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2 0.1 0.10 -0.03
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.5* 0.2 -0.4
[0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.2
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 866 931 410 476
Pseudo−R2 0.23 0.31
Log − likelihood -399.4 -183.7
R2 0.14 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B14: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (tax to assets ratio in lieu of tax to
sales ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.04*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2* 0.05 0.1
[0.10] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0004 0.0001 0.002*** 0.0005**
[0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]
MOFA -0.002 -0.02 -0.07 0.002
[0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0004 -0.001 -0.00003 -0.0006
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.04 -0.02 0.1* 0.05
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.1 0.07
[0.1] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.3*** 0.1** 0.2 0.07
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.08 0.1 0.07
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.09 -0.4*** -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.08 0.02 0.3* 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.3** 0.1* 0.04 0.005
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.09]
taxes to assets 0.00008 -0.000001 0.0006*** 0.00003
[0.00006] [0.00002] [0.0002] [0.00002]
internal funds (share) 0.2 0.07 0.1 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.04 -0.0006 0.09 -0.2
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.03 -0.04 0.4* -0.03
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.1 0.05 0.3 -0.04
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3 0.008 -1.7** -0.4**
[0.2] [0.1] [0.7] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3** 0.1 0.1 -0.05
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.2 0.4* 0.2 -0.3
[0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.7*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.010 -0.04
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 888 971 396 466
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.34
Log − likelihood -412.2 -168.3
R2 0.15 0.26
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B15: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (shares of finance of fixed assets from
various sources in lieu of shares of finance of working capital)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.010]
skill intensity 0.1 0.2* -0.1 0.01
[0.10] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.00009 0.001*** 0.0006*
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0004]
MOFA 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.004
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.001 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0006
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 0.003 0.1** 0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.08 0.04
[0.09] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.2*** 0.1 0.07
[0.10] [0.05] [0.10] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1** 0.09 0.06
[0.1] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
join partner 0.2** 0.1 -0.3** -0.1*
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.1 0.07 0.2 0.03
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2 0.09 -0.008 -0.01
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.05 -0.1 0.1 0.002
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: internal funds (share) -0.0007 -0.06 -0.04 -0.1
[0.09] [0.08] [0.1] [0.10]
finance fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) -0.08 -0.1 0.07 -0.06
[0.09] [0.09] [0.1] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) -0.1 -0.1 0.08 -0.07
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: borrow from family (share) 0.09 -0.09 -0.2 -0.2
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) -0.2 -0.09 -0.8** -0.5**
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
finance fixed assets: purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.06 -0.004 -0.01 -0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
finance fixed assets: new equity/debt (share) 0.04 -0.1 1.7** 0.1
[0.3] [0.3] [0.7] [0.6]
finance fixed assets: funds from parent company (share) 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.3**
[0.10] [0.10] [0.1] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.07 0.08 -0.02
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 959 1035 424 491
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.28
Log − likelihood -450.7 -195.6
R2 0.15 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-numbered columns,
respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-
dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered
columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B16: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (dummies for finance of working capital
from various sources in lieu of their shares)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02* 0.05*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.1 0.2* -0.2 0.006
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0007***
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.010
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.0009 -0.0010 -0.00008 -0.0007
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.0009]
M&As -0.01 -0.002 0.07 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.09 0.07
[0.08] [0.03] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.1*** 0.09 0.07
[0.10] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
input access 0.3** 0.1** 0.1 0.1
[0.10] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
join partner 0.2** 0.1 -0.3** -0.10
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.08 0.03 0.2 0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.03 0.02
[0.1] [0.06] [0.2] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.06 -0.1 0.2 -0.01
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (dummy) -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (dummy) -0.06** -0.06*** -0.01 -0.02
[0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (dummy) -0.03 -0.04 0.2*** 0.03
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05]
borrow from family (dummy) 0.010 -0.03 0.1* 0.07
[0.05] [0.04] [0.08] [0.05]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (dummy) 0.03 0.03 -0.3*** -0.2***
[0.07] [0.06] [0.1] [0.05]
purchases on credit/advances (dummy) -0.03 -0.02 -0.09* -0.006
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
new equity/debt (dummy) 0.07 0.1 0.2 0.1
[0.10] [0.08] [0.1] [0.09]
funds from parent company (dummy) 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.4*** 0.3***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
borrow from another source (dummy) -0.002 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
[0.08] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 971 1048 432 501
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.34
Log − likelihood -458.0 -183.0
R2 0.15 0.28
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B17: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (dummies for finance of fixed assets
from various sources in lieu of dummies for finance of working capital)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02 0.04** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.010
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.010]
skill intensity 0.1 0.2* -0.2 0.02
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0009
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.02 -0.001 0.1** 0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.05 0.05
[0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.1*** 0.02 0.06
[0.10] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1** 0.05 0.08
[0.10] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
join partner 0.2** 0.1* -0.3** -0.1
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.1 0.07 0.2 0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.1 0.09 0.004 -0.005
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.07 -0.1 0.3 0.003
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: internal funds (dummy) -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.08*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
finance fixed assets: borrow from affiliate-country banks (dummy) -0.04 -0.04 0.08* 0.03
[0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03]
finance fixed assets: borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (dummy) -0.05 -0.04 0.1* 0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05]
finance fixed assets: borrow from family (dummy) 0.05 -0.004 0.04 -0.06
[0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.06]
finance fixed assets: borrow from non-bank financial institutions (dummy) -0.1 -0.07 -0.2 -0.2*
[0.1] [0.05] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: purchases on credit/advances (dummy) -0.02 -0.010 0.08 -0.004
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
finance fixed assets: new equity/debt (dummy) 0.1 0.03 0.2 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
finance fixed assets: funds from parent company (dummy) 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.2***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
finance fixed assets: borrow from another source (dummy) 0.2** 0.08 0.2 0.10
[0.08] [0.08] [0.1] [0.2]
Obs 959 1035 424 491
Pseudo−R2 0.24 0.31
Log − likelihood -439.5 -189.0
R2 0.16 0.26
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, respec-
tively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy
covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B18: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (dummies for level of importance of
parental assistance in access to finance)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.02* 0.01 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.02] [0.010]
skill intensity 0.2** 0.2** -0.06 0.04
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0007*** 0.0002 0.002 0.0007**
[0.0003] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.04 -0.002 -0.05 -0.006
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0007 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0008
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.06 -0.03 0.09* 0.05
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.2* 0.09
[0.09] [0.03] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.09
[0.10] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.2 0.1
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.3*** 0.1** -0.3** -0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.2 0.07 0.4* 0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2* 0.1* 0.002 -0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.07 -0.1 0.2 0.04
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
access to finance: parental assistance unimportant 0.2** 0.1 0.04 0.02
[0.10] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
access to finance: parental assistance slightly important 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
[0.09] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
access to finance: parental assistance important 0.1* 0.06 0.1 0.08
[0.07] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
access to finance: parental assistance very important 0.09 0.06 0.007 0.04
[0.07] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
access to finance: parental assistance crucial 0.1* 0.1** 0.07 0.07
[0.07] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
Obs 983 1059 435 504
Pseudo−R2 0.16 0.21
Log − likelihood -496.8 -222.0
R2 0.098 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent
variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across
all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based
on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B19: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (acquisition mode of capital goods)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.01 0.01 0.05** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.010
[0.010] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.02 0.09 -0.1 -0.01
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
intangible to tangible capital 0.01*** 0.0004*** 0.002** 0.0008***
[0.004] [0.00008] [0.0009] [0.0002]
MOFA 0.03 0.005 -0.03 0.001
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.001 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0005
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.03 -0.007 0.08 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.2** 0.09*
[0.09] [0.04] [0.09] [0.05]
low cost 0.2** 0.1** 0.09 0.04
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
input access 0.3*** 0.1** 0.2 0.1
[0.10] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.4*** 0.1* -0.3** -0.08
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
export back home 0.2* 0.1 0.3** 0.2
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2 0.10 0.04 0.03
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.2 -0.07 0.3 0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
source of capital goods (imports) -0.0006 -0.01 -0.1 -0.10
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
source of capital goods (local) 0.0005 -0.05 -0.3** -0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
source of capital goods (parent) 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.1 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 781 847 435 505
Pseudo−R2 0.28 0.25
Log − likelihood -331.9 -210.1
R2 0.25 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies
in odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding
statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy
covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the
covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B20: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (sample of firms in manufacturing)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.02 0.02 0.07*** 0.03**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
productivity 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
skill intensity 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.09
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.006 0.0003** 0.002*** 0.0006**
[0.006] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA -0.003 -0.004 -0.07 0.0008
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
firm age 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.001
[0.001] [0.0010] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.03
[0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
market access 0.5*** 0.2*** 0.08 0.1*
[0.1] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.4*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.1
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.5*** 0.2** 0.1 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.08]
join partner 0.5*** 0.1 -0.3** -0.07
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.08]
export back home 0.7*** 0.2* 0.3 0.3
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.4*** 0.1** -0.10 0.06
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.09]
tax to sales 0.2 -0.05 0.07 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.1 0.3* 0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.06 0.3 -0.05
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.07 -0.02 0.5** 0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.3* 0.2 0.4 0.06
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.01 0.2 -2.0** -0.3
[0.2] [0.2] [0.9] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.3** 0.2* 0.2 -0.07
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
new equity/debt (share) 0.02 0.3 0.5 -0.2
[0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.9*** 0.3***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.2 0.08 0.02
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
Obs 629 692 351 406
Pseudo−R2 0.26 0.34
Log − likelihood -267.6 -146.4
R2 0.15 0.25
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and
even-numbered columns, respectively. Sample restricted to foreign affiliates in manufacturing industries. Dummies take value 1 if
the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy
covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed
in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the
description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B21: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (crisis effect 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.04*** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.2* 0.2** -0.10 0.03
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0005*** 0.00010 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.0004
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.001 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0003
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.001]
M&As -0.008 -0.001 0.08 0.04
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.04
[0.09] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06]
low cost 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3*** 0.1* -0.3* -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.07 0.4** 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2 0.1 0.01 -0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.09 -0.1 0.2 0.05
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 0.05 -0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.01 0.4* -0.02
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.05 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.4** 0.1 -1.8** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.1] [0.8] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2* 0.1 0.1 0.004
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.3 0.5** 0.3 -0.2
[0.3] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
pre-crisis performance well below expectations 0.004 -0.04 -0.01 0.2
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
pre-crisis performance below expectations 0.010 0.01 -0.01 -0.007
[0.07] [0.06] [0.1] [0.09]
pre-crisis performance in line with expectations 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.008
[0.06] [0.05] [0.09] [0.07]
pre-crisis performance above expectations -0.05 -0.04 0.09 0.02
[0.06] [0.05] [0.09] [0.07]
Obs 968 1045 429 498
Pseudo−R2 0.23 0.33
Log − likelihood -451.3 -185.4
R2 0.16 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B22: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (crisis effect 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.03** 0.02* 0.05** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02*
[0.009] [0.008] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.2* 0.2* -0.2 0.001
[0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.002*** 0.0006**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.007
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.0009 -0.001 0.0006 -0.0002
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.0010]
M&As -0.01 -0.004 0.08 0.05
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.08 0.04
[0.09] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.3** 0.2*** 0.1 0.08
[0.1] [0.05] [0.10] [0.08]
input access 0.3** 0.1* 0.1 0.06
[0.1] [0.06] [0.10] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.1* -0.3** -0.09
[0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.2 0.08 0.3* 0.1
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.2 0.1 0.03 -0.008
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.1 -0.09 0.2 0.02
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2* 0.09 -0.006 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.08 0.02 0.008 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.1 0.02 0.3 -0.05
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.05 0.10 -0.1
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.3* 0.10 -1.6*** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.1] [0.6] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2* 0.1 0.03 -0.01
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.3 0.5* 0.2 -0.3
[0.3] [0.2] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
post-crisis performance well below expectations -0.09 -0.10 -0.2 -0.1
[0.1] [0.10] [0.2] [0.1]
post-crisis performance below expectations -0.007 -0.08 0.02 0.06
[0.08] [0.09] [0.1] [0.09]
post-crisis performance in line with expectations -0.03 -0.09 0.002 0.08
[0.08] [0.09] [0.1] [0.09]
post-crisis performance above expectations -0.04 -0.09 0.05 0.09
[0.08] [0.09] [0.1] [0.09]
Obs 968 1045 429 498
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.33
Log − likelihood -456.0 -184.2
R2 0.16 0.29
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
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Table B23: Firm-level determinants of intra-firm trade (crisis effect 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
employment 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
productivity 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01
[0.010] [0.009] [0.01] [0.009]
skill intensity 0.01 0.1 -0.2 -0.02
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
intangible to tangible capital 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.002*** 0.0007**
[0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.02 0.0008 -0.07 0.0006
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
firm age 0.001 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0004
[0.0010] [0.0008] [0.001] [0.0010]
M&As -0.008 0.007 0.08 0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
market access 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.07 0.05
[0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06]
low cost 0.2** 0.1** 0.2 0.08
[0.10] [0.06] [0.10] [0.08]
input access 0.2** 0.09* 0.1 0.08
[0.10] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
join partner 0.3** 0.08 -0.3** -0.1
[0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.07]
export back home 0.3** 0.2 0.3* 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
TA benefits 0.1 0.1 0.002 -0.02
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.08]
tax to sales 0.08 -0.1 0.3 0.04
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.1]
internal funds (share) 0.2 0.08 -0.03 -0.2
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from affiliate-country banks (share) 0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.2
[0.1] [0.08] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from non-affiliate-country banks (share) 0.04 -0.04 0.2 -0.05
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
borrow from family (share) 0.2 0.2 -0.06 -0.2
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from non-bank financial institutions (share) 0.1 0.2 -1.7*** -0.5***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.7] [0.2]
purchases on credit/advances (share) 0.2* 0.2 -0.006 -0.02
[0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2]
new equity/debt (share) 0.03 0.3 0.1 -0.2
[0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.2]
funds from parent company (share) 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.3*
[0.1] [0.09] [0.2] [0.2]
borrow from another source (share) 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
post-crisis capacity utilisation: no change -0.03 -0.06 -0.2*** -0.04
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.06]
post-crisis capacity utilisation: decrease 0.007 -0.03 -0.2*** -0.1**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.05]
Obs 757 828 414 492
Pseudo−R2 0.24 0.34
Log − likelihood -336.0 -175.0
R2 0.15 0.30
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry and parent-country dummies in odd-numbered and even-
numbered columns, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. The non-dummy
dependent variables are not in logs. Among non-dummy covariates, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
calculated across all values of the covariates are displayed in odd-numbered columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table B24.
68
T
ab
le
B
24
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
va
ri
ab
le
s
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
in
tr
a
-fi
rm
im
p
or
ts
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
o
f
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
in
p
u
ts
im
p
or
te
d
fr
om
th
e
p
a
re
n
t
in
to
ta
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
in
p
u
ts
in
tr
a
-fi
rm
im
p
or
ts
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
in
p
u
ts
im
p
or
te
d
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
to
ta
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
in
p
u
ts
in
tr
a
-fi
rm
ex
p
o
rt
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
o
f
ex
p
or
ts
to
th
e
p
a
re
n
t/
si
st
er
affi
li
at
e
in
to
ta
l
d
ir
ec
t
ex
p
or
ts
in
tr
a
-fi
rm
ex
p
o
rt
s
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
ex
p
or
ts
to
th
e
p
a
re
n
t/
si
st
er
affi
li
at
e
in
to
ta
l
d
ir
ec
t
ex
p
or
ts
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
of
p
er
m
an
en
t
fu
ll
-t
im
e
em
p
lo
ye
es
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
to
ta
l
sa
le
s
to
to
ta
l
p
er
m
an
en
t
fu
ll
-t
im
e
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
sk
il
l
in
te
n
si
ty
sh
ar
e
of
p
er
m
an
en
t
fu
ll
-t
im
e
te
ch
n
ic
a
l,
su
p
er
v
is
or
y
an
d
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
em
p
lo
ye
es
in
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
fu
ll
-t
im
e
em
p
lo
ye
es
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
to
ta
n
g
ib
le
ca
p
it
al
ra
ti
o
of
th
e
su
m
of
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g
a
n
d
tr
ai
n
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
to
th
e
to
ta
l
va
lu
e
o
f
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
M
O
F
A
th
e
fi
rm
is
ow
n
ed
b
y
a
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
or
b
y
at
le
as
t
50
%
(d
u
m
m
y
)
fi
rm
a
g
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
ye
ar
s
si
n
ce
th
e
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
t
of
th
e
fi
rm
M
&
A
s
th
e
fo
re
ig
n
-o
w
n
ed
fi
rm
h
as
b
ee
n
ac
q
u
ir
ed
th
ro
u
gh
M
er
ge
rs
an
d
A
cq
u
is
it
io
n
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
m
a
rk
et
ac
ce
ss
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
v
es
to
r
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
ac
ce
ss
to
n
ew
m
ar
ke
ts
(d
u
m
m
y
)
lo
w
co
st
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
or
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
lo
w
er
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
co
st
(d
u
m
m
y
)
in
p
u
t
a
cc
es
s
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
o
r
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
ac
ce
ss
to
n
a
tu
ra
l
re
so
u
rc
es
/
in
p
u
ts
(d
u
m
m
y
)
jo
in
p
a
rt
n
er
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
o
r
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
co
ll
ab
or
at
io
n
w
it
h
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
p
a
rt
n
er
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ex
p
or
t
b
ac
k
h
o
m
e
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
o
r
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
ex
p
or
t
b
ac
k
to
h
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
T
A
b
en
efi
ts
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
v
es
to
r
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
o
st
co
u
n
tr
y
:
b
en
efi
ts
fr
o
m
a
tr
ad
e
a
g
re
em
en
t
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ot
h
er
m
ot
iv
e
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
m
ot
iv
e
of
fo
re
ig
n
in
ve
st
or
to
in
ve
st
in
th
e
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
:
an
y
ot
h
er
m
ot
iv
e
to
b
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ta
x
to
sa
le
s
ra
ti
o
of
ta
x
es
to
to
ta
l
sa
le
s
in
te
rn
al
fu
n
d
s
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
in
te
rn
al
fu
n
d
s/
re
ta
in
ed
ea
rn
in
gs
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
b
an
k
s
in
th
e
affi
li
at
e
co
u
n
tr
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
b
an
k
s
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
affi
li
at
e
co
u
n
tr
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
fa
m
il
y
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
om
fa
m
il
y
/f
ri
en
d
s/
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
le
n
d
er
s
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
n
on
-b
an
k
(fi
n
an
ci
al
)
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
n
on
-b
an
k
fi
n
an
ci
al
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(e
.g
.
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
s)
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
on
cr
ed
it
/
a
d
va
n
ce
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
p
u
rc
h
as
es
on
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
su
p
p
li
er
s
a
n
d
ad
va
n
ce
s
fr
o
m
cu
st
o
m
er
s
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
/d
eb
t
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
is
su
a
n
ce
of
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
or
d
eb
t
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
p
a
p
er
a
n
d
d
eb
en
tu
re
s)
fu
n
d
s
fr
o
m
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
a
n
y
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
th
e
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
an
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
n
o
th
er
so
u
rc
e
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
fr
om
an
y
ot
h
er
so
u
rc
e
to
b
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
sa
le
s
to
ta
l
va
lu
e
of
sa
le
s
of
th
e
fi
rm
av
er
a
g
e
w
a
ge
ra
ti
o
of
to
ta
l
w
ag
e
b
il
l
to
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
fu
ll
-t
im
e
em
p
lo
ye
es
m
o
n
th
ly
w
a
ge
(n
on
-p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
to
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
or
k
er
s)
ra
ti
o
of
m
on
th
ly
w
ag
e
fo
r
n
o
n
-p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
o
rk
er
s
to
m
on
th
ly
w
a
ge
fo
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
or
ke
rs
m
o
n
th
ly
w
a
ge
(m
a
n
a
ge
ri
a
l
to
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
or
ke
rs
)
ra
ti
o
of
m
on
th
ly
w
ag
e
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
w
o
rk
er
s
to
m
on
th
ly
w
a
ge
fo
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
o
rk
er
s
m
o
n
th
ly
w
a
ge
(m
a
n
a
ge
ri
a
l
to
n
on
-p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
or
ke
rs
)
ra
ti
o
of
m
on
th
ly
w
ag
e
fo
r
m
an
a
ge
ri
al
w
or
ke
rs
to
m
o
n
th
ly
w
ag
e
fo
r
n
on
-p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
o
rk
er
s
ta
x
to
as
se
ts
to
ta
l
ta
x
p
ay
m
en
t
to
to
ta
l
va
lu
e
o
f
as
se
ts
69
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
va
ri
ab
le
s
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
in
te
rn
al
fu
n
d
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
o
f
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
in
te
rn
a
l
fu
n
d
s/
re
ta
in
ed
ea
rn
in
g
s
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
in
th
e
affi
li
a
te
co
u
n
tr
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
a
ffi
li
a
te
co
u
n
tr
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
fa
m
il
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
fa
m
il
y
/f
ri
en
d
s/
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
le
n
d
er
s
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
n
on
-b
an
k
(fi
n
an
ci
al
)
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
o
rk
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
n
on
-b
a
n
k
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(e
.g
.
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
s)
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
on
cr
ed
it
/
a
d
va
n
ce
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
o
f
fi
n
an
ce
o
f
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
on
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
su
p
p
li
er
s
a
n
d
a
d
va
n
ce
s
fr
o
m
cu
st
o
m
er
s
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
/d
eb
t
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
th
ro
u
gh
is
su
an
ce
o
f
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
o
r
d
eb
t
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
p
a
p
er
a
n
d
d
eb
en
tu
re
s)
fu
n
d
s
fr
o
m
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
a
n
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
o
f
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
a
l
th
ro
u
gh
th
e
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
an
y
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
n
o
th
er
so
u
rc
e
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
w
or
k
in
g
ca
p
it
al
fr
o
m
an
y
ot
h
er
so
u
rc
e
to
b
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
in
te
rn
a
l
fu
n
d
s
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s
th
ro
u
gh
in
te
rn
al
fu
n
d
s/
re
ta
in
ed
ea
rn
in
gs
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
:
b
or
ro
w
fr
om
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
in
th
e
a
ffi
li
a
te
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
:
b
or
ro
w
fr
om
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
o
u
ts
id
e
th
e
affi
li
at
e
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
fa
m
il
y
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s
th
ro
u
gh
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
fa
m
il
y
/f
ri
en
d
s/
in
d
iv
id
u
al
le
n
d
er
s
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
o
rr
ow
fr
om
n
on
-b
an
k
(fi
n
an
ci
a
l)
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(s
h
a
re
)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
n
on
-b
a
n
k
fi
n
an
ci
al
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(e
.g
.
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
s)
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
on
cr
ed
it
/
ad
va
n
ce
s
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s
th
ro
u
gh
p
u
rc
h
as
es
on
cr
ed
it
fr
o
m
su
p
p
li
er
s
a
n
d
a
d
va
n
ce
s
fr
o
m
cu
st
o
m
er
s
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
/
d
eb
t
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
gh
is
su
an
ce
of
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
or
d
eb
t
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
p
a
p
er
a
n
d
d
eb
en
tu
re
s)
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
fu
n
d
s
fr
o
m
p
a
re
n
t
co
m
p
a
n
y
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
gh
th
e
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
an
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
a
n
o
th
er
so
u
rc
e
(s
h
ar
e)
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s
fr
om
an
y
ot
h
er
so
u
rc
e
to
b
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
in
te
rn
a
l
fu
n
d
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
an
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
gh
in
te
rn
al
fu
n
d
s/
re
ta
in
ed
ea
rn
in
g
s
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
:
b
or
ro
w
fr
om
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
in
th
e
a
ffi
li
a
te
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
:
b
or
ro
w
fr
om
a
ffi
li
a
te
-c
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
b
an
k
s
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
a
ffi
li
a
te
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
o
rr
ow
fr
o
m
fa
m
il
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
fa
m
il
y
/
fr
ie
n
d
s/
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
le
n
d
er
s
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
o
rr
ow
fr
om
n
on
-b
an
k
(fi
n
an
ci
a
l)
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
cr
ed
it
fr
om
n
on
-b
a
n
k
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
(e
.g
.
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
s)
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
:
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
on
cr
ed
it
/
ad
va
n
ce
s
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
p
u
rc
h
as
es
on
cr
ed
it
fr
om
su
p
p
li
er
s
a
n
d
a
d
va
n
ce
s
fr
o
m
cu
st
o
m
er
s
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
/
d
eb
t
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
ar
e
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
g
h
is
su
a
n
ce
o
f
n
ew
eq
u
it
y
or
d
eb
t
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
p
a
p
er
a
n
d
d
eb
en
tu
re
s)
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
fu
n
d
s
fr
o
m
p
a
re
n
t
co
m
p
a
n
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
a
n
ce
of
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
th
ro
u
gh
th
e
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
an
y
fi
n
a
n
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
a
ss
et
s:
b
or
ro
w
fr
om
a
n
o
th
er
so
u
rc
e
(d
u
m
m
y
)
th
e
fi
rm
h
as
a
n
on
-z
er
o
sh
a
re
of
fi
n
an
ce
o
f
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
fr
om
a
n
y
o
th
er
so
u
rc
e
to
b
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
70
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
va
ri
ab
le
s
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
n
ot
re
ce
iv
ed
as
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
an
ce
w
a
s
n
ot
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
u
n
im
p
or
ta
n
t
u
n
im
p
or
ta
n
t
as
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
an
ce
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
sl
ig
h
tl
y
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t
sl
ig
h
tl
y
im
p
or
ta
n
t
as
si
st
a
n
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
an
ce
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
im
p
or
ta
n
t
im
p
or
ta
n
t
as
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
a
re
n
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
ve
ry
im
p
or
ta
n
t
ve
ry
im
p
or
ta
n
t
as
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
an
ce
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
:
p
a
re
n
ta
l
as
si
st
a
n
ce
cr
u
ci
al
cr
u
ci
al
as
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
p
ar
en
t
in
ac
ce
ss
to
fi
n
an
ce
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
(d
u
m
m
y
)
so
u
rc
e
o
f
ca
p
it
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
(i
m
p
or
ts
)
ca
p
it
al
go
o
d
s
im
p
or
te
d
d
ir
ec
tl
y
b
y
th
e
fi
rm
(d
u
m
m
y
)
so
u
rc
e
o
f
ca
p
it
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
(l
o
ca
l)
ca
p
it
al
go
o
d
s
ac
q
u
ir
ed
fr
om
lo
ca
l
d
is
tr
ib
u
to
rs
(d
u
m
m
y
)
so
u
rc
e
o
f
ca
p
it
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
(p
ar
en
t)
ca
p
it
al
go
o
d
s
ac
q
u
ir
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
p
ar
en
t
co
m
p
an
y
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
re
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
w
el
l
b
el
ow
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
w
el
l
b
el
ow
ov
er
al
l
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
b
ef
or
e
th
e
gl
ob
al
fi
n
a
n
ci
al
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
re
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
b
el
ow
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
b
el
ow
ov
er
al
l
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
b
ef
or
e
th
e
gl
ob
a
l
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
of
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
re
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
ov
er
a
ll
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
b
ef
or
e
th
e
g
lo
b
al
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
re
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
ab
ov
e
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
ab
ov
e
ov
er
al
l
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
b
ef
o
re
th
e
g
lo
b
al
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
cr
is
is
of
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
re
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
w
el
l
a
b
ov
e
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
w
el
l
ab
ov
e
ov
er
al
l
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
b
ef
or
e
th
e
gl
ob
a
l
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
w
el
l
b
el
ow
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
w
el
l
b
el
ow
re
v
is
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
af
te
r
th
e
gl
ob
al
fi
n
a
n
ci
al
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
b
el
ow
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
b
el
ow
re
v
is
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
a
ft
er
th
e
gl
o
b
al
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
of
2
00
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
re
v
is
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
af
te
r
th
e
g
lo
b
al
fi
n
an
ci
a
l
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
a
b
ov
e
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
a
b
ov
e
re
v
is
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
af
te
r
th
e
gl
ob
al
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
cr
is
is
of
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
w
el
l
ab
ov
e
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
co
m
p
an
y
’s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
w
el
l
a
b
ov
e
re
v
is
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
af
te
r
th
e
gl
ob
al
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
o
f
2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
ca
p
a
ci
ty
u
ti
li
sa
ti
o
n
:
n
o
ch
a
n
g
e
n
o
ch
an
ge
in
ca
p
ac
it
y
u
ti
li
sa
ti
o
n
af
te
r
th
e
g
lo
b
al
fi
n
a
n
ci
al
cr
is
is
of
20
07
–2
00
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
ca
p
a
ci
ty
u
ti
li
sa
ti
o
n
:
d
ec
re
as
e
d
ec
re
as
e
in
ca
p
ac
it
y
u
ti
li
sa
ti
on
af
te
r
th
e
gl
ob
al
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
of
20
0
7–
20
08
(d
u
m
m
y
)
p
o
st
-c
ri
si
s
ca
p
a
ci
ty
u
ti
li
sa
ti
o
n
:
in
cr
ea
se
in
cr
ea
se
in
ca
p
ac
it
y
u
ti
li
sa
ti
on
a
ft
er
th
e
gl
o
b
a
l
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
of
20
0
7–
20
0
8
(d
u
m
m
y
)
N
o
te
s
:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
n
o
ta
ti
o
n
.
71
